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TORT EXPERIMENTS IN THE LABORATORIES OF
DEMOCRACY
ALEXANDRA B. KLAss*

ABSTRACT

This Article considers the broad range of "tortexperiments" states
have undertaken in recent years, as well as the changingattitudesof
Congress and the Supreme Court toward state tort law. Notably,
while states have limited tort rights and remedies in the products
liability and personal injury areas in recent years, they have at the
same time increasedtort rightsand remedies to address new societal
problems associated with privacy, publicity, consumer protection,
and environmental harm. At the same time, however, Congress has
eliminatedstate tort law entirely in targetedareas without replacing
it with corresponding federal remedies. The Supreme Court has
likewise cut back on the ability of states to provide their citizens with
tort rights and remedies through the preemption doctrine and due
process limits on punitive damages.
This Article explores these trends in the states, Congress, and the
Supreme Court and concludes that part of the problem in federalstate relations in the area of tort law is that the Supreme Court has
shifted from a private law to a public law conception of tort that does
not give sufficient attention to the important private law goals tort
law still serves. This has allowed the Court to displace more easily
state tort law without consideringthe need for any substitute federal
remedy. Once the private law aspects of torts are recognized, it
becomes easier to identify and value the role tort law plays in our
federalist system.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I received valuable
comments on earlier versions of this Article from Allan Erbsen, Daniel Farber, Barry Feld,
Robert Glicksman, Brad Karkkainen, Michael Madison, William McGeveran, J.B. Ruh],
Daniel Schwarcz, and Catherine Sharkey. I also benefited greatly from comments received
at faculty workshops at the University of Minnesota Law School, Emory University School
of Law, the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, and Notre Dame Law School. Sara
Bergan provided excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article considers tort "experiments" in the states and the
increasingly complicated and dynamic relationship between state
legislatures, Congress, and state and federal courts in the area of
tort law. The idea of the states engaging in "experiments" is, of
course, not new. As Justice Brandeis stated in 1932, one of the basic
values of our federalist system of government is that it encourages
innovation by allowing for the possibility that "a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."'
In recent years, states have engaged in significant "experiments"
in the area of tort law. These experiments take many forms. First,
state legislative "tort reform" efforts have continued unabated for
over two decades as states enact increasing numbers of statutes
to place limits on compensatory and punitive damages, create regulatory compliance defenses for consumer claims against drug
manufacturers, impose new statutes of limitation and statutes of
repose for products liability and other tort claims, place additional
limits on claims for medical malpractice, and otherwise supplant
historic common law tort developments in these areas.2 State tort
experiments, however, are not limited to tort "reform" that restricts
common law rights and remedies. Indeed, at the same time states
are decreasing the rights of their citizens to bring certain types of
claims for personal injury against drug manufacturers, product
manufacturers, doctors, and others, they are also increasing the
rights of their citizens to bring other types of tort claims in targeted
areas such as consumer fraud, privacy, publicity, and environmental protection. Likewise, in recent years, state attorneys general and
local governments have been reviving the common law tort of public
nuisance in efforts to obtain injunctive relief and damages for harm
caused by lead paint, gun violence, greenhouse gas emissions, and
mortgage foreclosures.3
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part II.B.
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Such a variety of activity in the area of state tort law is not
surprising. Along with public health and safety, tort law is seen as
a classic area of "traditional state concern" even as Congress and
federal agencies play an ever-increasing role in regulating drugs,
consumer products, the environment, and many other substantive
areas that frequently are the subject of state tort law claims.4 The
continuing ability of states to engage in tort experiments has been
called into question, however, by developments in Congress and the
Supreme Court. While Congress has not enacted comprehensive
federal tort reform, in recent years it has enacted targeted legislation to immunize certain industries, most recently the gun industry,
from state lawsuits without any alternative federal remedy, as had
been done with prior legislation to protect vaccine manufacturers,
the nuclear power industry, and other industries.5
Likewise, the Supreme Court appears to have excluded state tort
6
law from its "federalism revolution" that began in the 1990s.
Indeed, at the same time the Court was cutting back on Congress's
4. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (describing state tort
law as an area of "traditional state regulation," confirming that there is a "presumption"
against preemption of such state law, and holding that the Court would not find that
congressional legislation in that area preempted state law unless Congress made such
intention '"clear and manifest"') (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)
(describing the "historic primacy of state regulation of matters of public health and safety"
and applying the presumption against federal preemption of state law to plaintiff's common
law tort claims against medical device manufacturer); N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)); Hillsborough County v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,715 (1985) (refusing to find that federal regulations
setting minimum standards for the collection of blood plasma preempted a county ordinance
governing blood plasma centers in part because the county ordinance addressed a matter of
health and safety, which fell under the '"historic police powers of the State") (quoting Jones
v. Roth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). See generally Alexandra B. Klass, State
Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from Environmental Law, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1653
(2009) (describing rise of the federal regulatory state in areas of traditional state regulation
and trends in federal preemption jurisprudence).
5. See infra Part III.
6. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 129-53 (2001) (explaining the Rehnquist Court's "federalism revolution");
Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States'Rights Blues to Blue States'Rights:FederalismAfter the
Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 799, 808 (2006) (discussing limits on the scope of the
Rehnquist Court's "federalism revolution"); Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Allows
Disabled GeorgiaInmate To Proceed with Suit Against State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at
A27 (using the term "federalism revolution" to describe the series of decisions during the
Rehnquist Court era which limited congressional power to make federal law binding on the
states); see also infra Part IV.A.

20091

TORT EXPERIMENTS

1505

authority under the Commerce Clause in the name of states' rights,
it began to limit significantly the ability of states to provide tort
rights and remedies for its citizens by preempting common law and
statutory claims for damages associated with drugs, medical
devices, and consumer products under the Supremacy Clause, and
limiting punitive damage awards under the Due Process Clause.7
This Article attempts to shed new light on the federal-state relationship in the area of tort law through a broad analysis of state tort
"experiments" that include legislative and common law efforts to
both limit and expand tort rights and remedies. In doing so, it
concludes first that both Congress and the Supreme Court have
exhibited a growing hostility to state tort law in recent years that
stands in contrast to the rhetoric surrounding states' rights that
exists in these bodies' statements and actions in other areas of law.
Second, this Article concludes that despite the efforts of tort
theorists to classify tort law as either public law or private law,
state experiments with tort law demonstrate that states use tort law
to provide their citizens both with the right to obtain redress for
private wrongs and also to achieve public regulatory goals. The
variation in tort experiments shows that some new torts may fall
more on the public law side than the private law side, and viceversa, but that tort law today is not a monolith that can be analyzed
exclusively as public law or private law.
Part I begins with a brief background on the law of torts as well
as a short summary of currents trends in tort theory today. At the
present time, there are two main theoretical approaches to tort law.
The first and dominant approach sees tort law as a branch of public
regulatory law intended to serve state interests of deterring undesirable conduct, compensating victims of wrongdoing, and spreading
societal losses.8 The second approach views tort law as private law
rather than public regulatory law.9 Under this private law approach,
7. See infra Part IV.A-B.
8. See John C.P. Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of Tort Law: Due Processand the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 580-83 (2005) (stating that
Justice Traynor, Fleming James, William Prosser, and Leon Green had "grander aspirations"
for tort law than merely being a law for the redress of private wrongs, and instead, embraced
a view of tort law as public regulatory law that would produce desired policy outcomes).
9. See, e.g., id. at 596-606; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not CorrectiveJustice,
91 GEo. L.J. 695, 709-33 (2003).
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tort law is a form of corrective justice or, as formulated by John
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky, the means by which a state
provides its citizens with the right to obtain redress for private
wrongs. 10
Part II then analyzes a wide spectrum of recent state legislative
and judicial actions to modify tort law not only to decrease the scope
of tort law, such as traditional tort reform, but also to increase it,
particularly in areas of consumer rights, privacy, publicity, and
environmental protection. This Part also discusses the extent to
which states use these tort "experiments" to achieve public law and
private law goals.
Part III considers congressional responses to state tort experiments which, in the past, generally resulted in replacing state tort
law with a federal regulatory framework or compensatory remedy,
but now more often result in eliminating state tort law rights and
remedies altogether without creating any substitute federal
framework or remedy.
Part IV considers the Supreme Court's review of state tort law.
This analysis includes recent decisions involving Congress's authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause, federal preemption
doctrine, and due process limits on punitive damages, all of which
directly affect the ability of states to continue to experiment with
statutory tort law as well as the common law. Through this analysis, Part IV shows that the Supreme Court has almost completely
excluded state tort law from its rhetoric on states' rights and
federalism and explores the ways in which that has occurred.
Finally, Part V returns to tort theory in an effort to provide some
additional insights on the federal-state relationship in tort law
today. This Part first shows how the Supreme Court has failed to
recognize the private law aspects of tort in its recent decisions,
which has allowed it to displace more easily tort law under doctrines of preemption and due process. It then discusses the inherent
values of tort law and argues that the Court should more fully
recognize both the public and private aspects of tort law in its
preemption and punitive damages cases. This recognition should
10. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, What Are We Reforming? Tort Theory's Place in Debates
over Malpractice Reform, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2006); Goldberg, supra note 8;
Zipursky, supra note 9, at 695 (discussing corrective justice theory).
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result in less preemption of state law in cases in which Congress has
not expressed a clear intent to preempt state tort law. It should also
result in more deference to state juries and courts in punitive
damages cases when such verdicts are challenged under the Due
Process Clause.
Ultimately, by focusing on the range of state tort experiments
and the private as well as the public law interests they serve, this
Article attempts to explore the values of tort law in a way that may
assist in understanding and resolving tensions between the federal
and state governments in this area of law. If there begins to be a
greater understanding of how state legislatures and state courts
expand and contract tort law to promote rights to obtain redress for
private wrongs as well as public regulatory goals, scholars and the
courts can use principles of federalism, preemption, and due process
in a manner that fully considers the private, as well as the public,
benefits of state tort law in deciding whether and how to replace it.
I. TORT LAW AND TORT THEORY

A "tort" has been defined broadly as conduct that amounts to a
legal wrong (other than breach of contract) "that causes harm for
which courts will impose civil liability."" Tort law includes private
lawsuits against public or private defendants under common law
claims of battery, negligence, nuisance, strict liability, conversion,
and other theories to recover for a wide range of economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief to compel
certain actions or to prevent certain actions.1 2 Tort law also includes
private rights of action under state and federal statutes to recover
statutorily-specified damages or injunctive relief associated with
private wrongs against the plaintiff that the statute was enacted to
prevent.' 3 Claims under state consumer protection laws and privacy
11. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2000); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORT 1-7 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (stating that
a satisfactory definition of a "tort" has yet to be found, but describing the purpose of the law
of torts to adjust losses and give compensation for injury sustained by one person as a result
of the conduct of another, and describing as a "central idea" of tort law that "liability must be
based upon conduct which is socially unreasonable").
12. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
13. See DOBBS, supra note 11.
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laws are examples of this type of tort claim.' 4 Going further afield
from "traditional" tort claims are civil actions brought by states and
local governments under theories of public nuisance to compel
behavior that has a widespread impact on a state, city, neighborhood, or natural resource. 5 Some examples of public nuisance tort
suits include those filed against the gun industry to prevent gun
violence, against paint manufacturers to remediate lead paint in
buildings, and against auto companies and power plants to obtain
injunctive relief or damages associated with the release of greenhouse gas emissions that lead to climate change.' 6
Although all of these claims fall within the definition of a "tort,"
some of these torts appear to have significant private law characteristics, in that they are efforts to use the civil justice system to
address wrongs done by private parties to private parties, even
though they also may achieve public law deterrence and compensation benefits. Other types of claims, such as the public nuisance
cases, appear to be primarily examples of public law in that the
state or local government could achieve the relief sought through
alternate means such as regulation or taxation of the activity sought
to be compelled or prevented. Although such variation in the forms
and purposes of tort law may not be surprising, it is precisely this
variation that makes it difficult to determine how to "classify" tort
law, as many theorists and, ultimately, courts, have attempted to
do.
The current literature shows there are two major "camps" of
torts scholars today.17 The first treats tort law as merely a branch
of the public regulatory state.' 8 Law and economics scholars such as
Judge Richard Posner, who view tort law as a means of identifying
and achieving the most cost-effective mix of precaution and injury,
fall into this camp. 9 Also in this camp are Progressive and Realist
14. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 3-4.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See, e.g., Gary J. Schwartz, Mixed Theoriesof Tort Law:Affirming Both Deterrenceand
Corrective Justice, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1801, 1801 (1997) (introducing each camp).
18. See id.
19. See generallyWILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUcrURE
OF TORT LAW (1987); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:A
'Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849,859-60,905-08 (1984); Zipursky,
supra note 9, at 696-97 (discussing views of "instrumentalists," including law and economics
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scholars such as Fleming James, Leon Green, and William Prosser,
who, along with their followers, see tort law as a mechanism to
distribute losses, provide compensation to victims of accidents,
further social justice, and punish corporate misconduct.2" Both the
economic-deterrence group and the Progressive-Realist group focus
almost exclusively on the instrumental nature of tort law, viewing
it as another branch of public law.2 1
The second "camp" of tort scholars views tort as private law.22
This group includes "corrective justice" scholars such as George
Fletcher, Richard Epstein, Jules Coleman, and Ernest Weinrib,
who see tort law as a private law means of restoring equilibrium
between a victim and tortfeasor so as to make the victim whole.23
The private law camp also includes John Goldberg and Benjamin
Zipursky, who argue that tort law exists to redress private wrongs.
According to Goldberg and Zipursky, tort law empowers a victim to
seek private redress from a wrongdoer who has acted wrongfully
toward him or her; the victim is not simply the vicarious beneficiary
of a duty owed to the public at large. 24 By articulating duties of
conduct that individuals and entities owe to each other, tort law
empowers those injured by breaches of those duties to invoke the
law to go after wrongdoers.25 Thus, as a victim's rights law, tort law
helps sustain a distinctly liberal notion of civil society, assures
scholars who view tort law and other traditional "private law" fields as a matter of public law).
20. See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 581-82; see also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND
FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 16-20 (3d ed. 2007) (describing tort theories of optimal deterrence,
loss distribution, compensation, and redress of social grievances as views of tort law concerned
with affecting the behavior of future actors or achieving other sorts of instrumental goals).
21. See Goldberg, supra note 8, at 580-83; Zipursky, supra note 9, at 696-97 (stating that
instrumentalists, including law and economics scholars, see tort law and other "private" areas
of law as really a matter of public law).
22. See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1201.
23. See id. at 1801-02 (discussing corrective justice and other theoretical frameworks);
Zipursky, supra note 9, at 695-97 (discussing corrective justice theory); see also JULES L.
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995);
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); George P.
Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
24. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 530; Zipursky, supra note 9, at 697-99.
25. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 530; Zipursky, supra note 9, at 733-53; see also Jason M.
Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(discussing "civil recourse" theory of tort law as articulated by Goldberg and Zipursky,
comparing it to corrective justice theory, and attempting to provide a normative justification
for a law of civil recourse).
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citizens that government is committed to attend to their complaints
on a more or less individualized basis, and avoids excessive reliance
on top-down regulation.26 In their view, even though tort law may
have the effect of deterring undesirable conduct or compensating
injured parties, thus meeting public law goals, tort law's hallmark
is the creation of a system of recovery for private wrongs to be
utilized by injured parties.2"
As the following Parts will show, the current dominance of tort
law as "public law" has made it difficult for courts to recognize fully
the importance of state tort experiments and the value of retaining
state tort law in today's federal regulatory state. If tort law is
simply another form of public law balancing the burdens and
benefits of economic life, it ceases to be either a matter of traditional28
state concern or a unique institution to resolve private disputes.
When these features of tort law are disregarded, it becomes easier
for the courts to displace tort law in favor of federal regulatory
policy. If, however, tort law represents a private system of redress
that is distinct from any substitute public regulatory system, there
are additional arguments in favor of retaining state tort law in the
absence of a strong federal need for uniformity or a federal system
of redress that would replace state tort law. Part II now considers
a wide range of state tort experiments, with a focus on both the
public law and private law aspects of these torts, to show the
importance of states as 'laboratories" in both areas.
II. TORT "EXPERIMENTS"
Initially, tort law was almost exclusively a matter of state
common law.2 9 It was judge-made law that was constantly evolving
and adapting to address new concerns, new technologies, and
26. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 10, at 1077-78 ("[C]ontrary to compensation-anddeterrence theory, the tort system is not best understood as arming victims with the power
to sue in order to serve public goals such as deterrence and compensation. Instead, it arms
victims because they are entitled to be so armed.").
27. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 8, at 530.
28. See, e.g., id. at 575-80 (discussing how the current judicial view of tort law as public
law rather than a unique form of state private redress allows courts more easily to displace
it).
29. See DOBBS, supra note 11, at 1.
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changing social norms. 0 During the twentieth century, state courts
throughout the country expanded and modified long-standing tort
doctrine in a manner that provided consumers and employees with
greater protections while increasing legal liability on employers,
product manufacturers, doctors, and other professionals. For instance, courts expanded product liability theory to allow plaintiffs
to recover without regard to fault, holding product manufacturers
and distributors strictly liable if the product was either produced or
sold with a defect that caused injury.3 1 Likewise, lawsuits against
chemical companies, asbestos companies, the tobacco industry, and
drug manufacturers resulted in courts using doctrines of joint and
several liability and market share liability to fashion remedies
compensating thousands of plaintiffs by imposing liability on
multiple defendants." In these cases, courts also recognized and
expanded historic but politically controversial remedies-such as
punitive damages3 3 and noneconomic damages 4 ina manner that
30. See, e.g., id. (stating that tort law "is predominantly common law" although a
statutory or constitutional provision may make certain conduct legally wrong, permitting the
recovery of damages for such conduct); KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 20-21 (discussing how
the common law precedent and legal history bear on current judicial decisions and that the
development of tort law has always been influenced by "the social, economic, and political
forces of the time"); F. Patrick Hubbard, The Natureand Impact of the Tort Reform Movement,
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 464-66 (2006) (discussing evolving nature of the common law of
torts).
31. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); see DOBBS, supra
note 11, at 974-77 (describing shift to strict liability theory for defective products); JAMES A.
HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 464-69 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing the transition from
liability based on negligence and warranty to strict products liability with regard to the
manufacture of defective products); Frances E. Zollers et al., Looking Backward, Looking
Forward:Reflections on Twenty Years of Product LiabilityReform, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019,
1022-23 (2000) (describing doctrinal shift to strict products liability).
32. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924,933-38 (Cal. 1980) (adopting the notion
of market-share liability, which distributes liability based on each defendant's relative share
of the market, when generic products from several manufacturers all possessed the same
defect that produced the injuries, even though plaintiffs could not trace their harms to any
specific manufacturer); see also DOBBS, supra note 11, at 430-32 (describing courts' use of
market-share liability); John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past
and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1036-49 (2005) (same).
33. Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory damages, awarded to a
plaintiff to punish the defendant for outrageous or intentionally wrongful conduct and to deter
the defendant and others from engaging in such conduct in the future. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and
Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 90 (2007).
34. Noneconomic damages (or nonpecuniary damages) compensate a plaintiff for pain and
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created an increased liability burden on the business community.
In these ways, courts have been "experimenting" with tort law
through the development of common law for well over a century.
Starting in the 1970s, however, state legislatures and, in some
cases, Congress35 began to enact legislation to limit common law tort
doctrine in response to concerns of the business and medical
communities that tort liability had reached a "crisis" point that was
hindering their ability to obtain insurance, produce products, and
participate in the market. These concerns led to a series of state
"tort experiments" over the next several decades to limit traditional
tort liability primarily in the areas of personal injury, medical
malpractice, and products liability. 6 At the same time, however,
state legislatures and state courts engaged in parallel tort experiments to expand tort liability in the areas of consumer rights,
privacy, publicity, and environmental protection. This Part examines these contractions and expansions in tort law and explores the
public law and private law goals states are attempting to meet
through their experiments in this area.
This Part shows that virtually all of these different types of tort
claims fall along a continuum, with some having more private law
characteristics and others having more public law characteristics.
Traditional tort claims fall closer to the private law side of the
continuum;"7 the new statutory tort claims for fraud, privacy, and
consumer protection fall somewhere in the middle;3" whereas the
state and local government common law nuisance suits fall on the
public law side.3 9 Where the various claims fall on the continuum
does not impact their validity as "real" tort claims but instead
highlights the mixed nature of the goals, both public and private,
that tort law continues to attempt to achieve.

suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and other physical and emotional consequences of injury
separate and apart from economic or pecuniary loss. See McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d
372,374-75 (N.Y. 1989); HENDERSON ETAL., supra note 31, at 585-86 (discussing various forms
of noneconomic damages).
35. For a discussion of congressional responses to the real or perceived tort "crisis" with
regard to certain industries, see infra Part III.
36. See MARc A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 809-11 (8th ed. 2006).
37. See infra Part IIA.
38. See infra Part II.B.
39. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Tort Contractions:TraditionalState 'Tort Reform"
1. Statutory Tort Reform
The most well known state tort experiments are state legislative
efforts over the past thirty years to limit plaintiff tort rights and
remedies under the common law to recover damages for personal
injury (and sometimes property damage) in products liability,
medical malpractice, and other claims where individuals are seeking
relief against manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, medical
device companies, hospitals, and doctors.4 °
The first wave of state statutory "tort reform ' 41 occurred in the
1970s and centered on claims for medical malpractice.4 2 In response
to physician complaints of high malpractice insurance premiums,
many state legislatures responded by placing caps on pain and
suffering damages, regulating fees of plaintiffs' attorneys, shortening statutes of limitation, or altering or eliminating the collateral
source rule.4 3
The second wave of tort reform took place in the mid-1980s in
response to what was perceived, rightly or not, as a "crisis" in tort
law due to the increasing unavailability of liability insurance
coverage for businesses as a result of increasing tort liability.4 4
Between 1985 and 1988, virtually all state legislatures enacted
some form of tort reform legislation, which included placing limits
on recovery of noneconomic damages (such as pain and suffering
damages), eliminating or placing caps on punitive damages, altering

40. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 809-11.
41. Notably, although the term "tort reform" is generally used today to refer to
congressional and state legislative efforts to limit common law tort rights and remedies, it
was used during the early part of the twentieth century to refer to legislative efforts to expand
common law rights and remedies, arising out of a concern that tort law was not providing
adequate protection to the victims of workplace injuries. See Robert L. Rabin, Poking Holes
in the Fabricof Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 293, 293 (2007).
42. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 809; see also Catherine M. Sharkey,
Unintended Consequences of Medical MalpracticeDamage Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 413
(2005) (describing "waves" of medical malpractice and other tort reforms).
43. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 809-10; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 20, at
223-24 (discussing the collateral source rule).
44. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 810.
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existing doctrines applicable to joint and several liability 45 and
comparative fault,4 6 and enacting statutes of repose to protect
product manufacturers. 47 These reforms often applied across the
board in all types of tort claims, in contrast to the prior reforms that
had targeted primarily claims for medical malpractice.4 8
A third wave began in the early 1990s and continues into the
present. These reforms place additional caps on noneconomic and
punitive damages, modify joint and several liability rules, place
limits on the ability of courts to certify class actions, and immunize
entire industries from certain types of claims. 49 For instance, in
2003, Texas enacted a comprehensive tort reform bill that placed
a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
cases and a separate $250,000 cap for hospital facilities, barred
punitive damages unless the jury verdict was unanimous, created
a safe harbor for drugs and other products that meet government
standards, modified joint and several liability rules, imposed a
fifteen-year statute of repose for product liability cases, adopted feeshifting rules, reduced bond-posting requirements for appeals, and
provided for interlocutory appeals of class action certification
orders.5 ° Likewise, in 2004, Ohio enacted legislation that placed a
45. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 123 (discussing joint and several liability).
46. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 810-11. Under comparative fault principles,
a plaintiff's recovery in a negligence action may be reduced, but not eliminated, by the
plaintiff's own fault. By contrast, under a contributory fault regime, the plaintiff's own
negligence can act as a complete bar to recovery. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at
366-67.
47. Statutes of repose bar all claims against a defendant a certain number of years after
the product had been placed in the stream of commerce, regardless of when the plaintiff was
injured or had knowledge of the injury. By contrast, a statute of limitations begins to run or
"accrues" when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and the identity of the
defendant. Thus, under a statute of repose, a plaintiff's claim might be time-barred even
before the plaintiff sustains any injury, making a lawsuit impossible. See DOBBS, supra note
11, at 550-61 (discussing statutes of limitations and statutes of repose); see also Montgomery
v. Wyeth, 540 F. Supp. 2d 933 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (holding that a Tennessee statute of repose
barring claims one year after a product expiration date prevented plaintiff's claim against a
diet drug manufacturer even though her disease did not develop until five years after the
product expiration date, thus barring the claim before it even accrued, and urging the
Tennessee legislature to examine the law in light of its harsh results).
48. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 810; see also infra notes 53-56 and accompanying
text (discussing targeted immunity legislation).
49. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 812.
50. See TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001-26.003 (Vernon 2008) (addressing
class action and fee-shifting rules); §§ 74.301-74.302 (setting limits on noneconomic and
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$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages involving "non-catastrophic"
injuries (or three times economic damages up to $350,000 per
plaintiff), with a maximum limit of $500,000 per occurrence. 5 An
earlier tort reform measure imposed a $350,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases. The 2004 Ohio
legislation also limits punitive damages to not more than two times
the compensatory damages or 10 percent of a defendant's net worth,
not to exceed $350,000.52
Notably, some of the recent state statutory tort reform provides
partial or complete immunity for entire industries. For instance,
between 2000 and 2005, at least thirteen states-including Arizona,
Colorado, Georgia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan,
Missouri, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington- enacted statutes that exempt completely from civil liability manufacturers, marketers, distributors, advertisers, sellers, and suppliers
of food and beverages for claims based on obesity, weight gain, or
health conditions relating to consumption of these products.5 3
Beginning in 1999, numerous states enacted legislation shielding
gun manufacturers and distributors from lawsuits by states, local
governments, and private parties that had sought (or might seek
in the future) injunctive relief or damages from harm resulting
from third-party use of firearms.54 Arizona, Colorado, Ohio, Oregon,
Utah, North Dakota, and New Jersey have immunized pharmaceutical companies from punitive damages for injuries resulting from
economic damages); §§ 82.007-82.008 (creating rebuttable presumption in favor of defendants
in certain product liability actions); § 41.003(d) (providing for punitive damages only in the
case of a unanimous jury); FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 813-14; David A. Anderson,
Judicial Tort Reform in Texas, 26 REV. LITIG. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing Texas statutory tort
reform).
51. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.18(B)(2) (West 2004); see also Arbino v. Johnson &
Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420, 433 (Ohio 2007) (discussing Ohio statutory limits on noneconomic
damages and punitive damages).
52. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (D)(2)(b) (West 2004).
53. See generally NA'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FOOD VENDOR LAWSUIT

IMMUNITY (2005), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/fvmemo.htm (last visited Mar. 2,2009)
(summarizing state legislation). Most of these state laws are modeled after federal legislation
that was introduced in the House of Representatives in 2003, but was not enacted. Id.
54. See Elizabeth T. Crouse, Note, Arming the Gun Industry: A Critique of Proposed
LegislationShielding the Gun Industry from Liability,88 MINN. L. REV. 1346, 1357-59 (2004).
Congress enacted similar legislation preempting such suits nationwide in 2005. See infra
notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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FDA-approved products unless the plaintiff can show the defendant
fraudulently obtained FDA approval.5 5 In 1995, Michigan enacted
a statute that provides immunity to pharmaceutical companies from
all liability for injuries resulting from FDA-approved products
except in cases of fraud.5 6
Interest groups representing the business community were a
significant factor in fueling this legislative activity. In 1986, the
American Medical Association and the American Council of
Engineering Companies cofounded the American Tort Reform
Association ("ATRA"). 57 ATRA describes itself as "the only national
organization exclusively dedicated to reforming the civil justice
system," and consists of a "nationwide network of state-based liability reform coalitions backed by 135,000 grassroots supporters.""8
Its members include Fortune 500 companies in the manufacturing,
pharmaceutical, medical, and medical device sectors, along with
interest groups representing those business sectors. 9 ATRA lobbies
Congress and state legislatures to enact health care liability and
class action reform, abolish joint and several liability and the
collateral source rule, place limits on punitive and noneconomic
damages, enact product liability and appeal bond reform, ensure
"sound science in the courtroom," and stop "regulation through
55. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302.5(5)(a) (2008);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(6)-(7) (2008); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(c) (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.927 (2008); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-8-203 (2008); In re Aredia & Zometa Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 3:06-MD-1760, 2007
WL 649266, at **7-9 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 27, 2007) (discussing New Jersey statute); Kobar v.
Novartis, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1168-69 (D. Ariz. 2005) (discussing Arizona statute). But see
McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223, 272-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (invalidating
a fraud exception to New Jersey's statutory limitation on punitive damage claims against
drug manufacturers under federal preemption principles).
56. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 2008). Several additional statesColorado, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah-provide
more limited protection from failure-to-warn claims by creating a rebuttable presumption in
favor of FDA-approved drugs. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency
Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 841, 850 (2008) (discussing and citing state statutory
regulatory compliance defenses). For a discussion of case law interpreting state regulatory
compliance defenses, see infra notes 345-56 and accompanying text.
57. See Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, At a Glance, http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Mar.
2, 2009).
58. Id.
59. See Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Sample List of ATRA Members, http://www.atra.org/
abouttmembers.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
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litigation."' According to its website, since ATRA's founding more
than forty-five states have enacted portions of ATRA's legislative
agenda.6 1 Indeed, ATRA's goals are not "just to pass laws" but "to
change the way people think about personal responsibility and civil
litigation."6 2
Part of that effort was to characterize much of tort law today as
"regulation through litigation," with the message being that reforms
are necessary to quell abuses of the process. 3 Although the term
"regulation by litigation" was initially coined to describe specific
actions where state attorneys general collaborated with private
lawyers to sue tobacco companies, the gun industry, and other major
industries, the term is now also used by tort reform advocates as
well as some legal scholars to include private class actions and
other more traditional private party tort actions.' Thus, the concept
60. Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, At a Glance, supra note 57.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. (stating that one of ATRA's goals is to "stop legislation through litigation"); see
also Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, http://www.thecre.com/regbylit/about.html (last visited
Mar. 2, 2009) (describing "regulation by litigation").
64. See JOHN FUND & MARTIN MORSE WOOSTER, THE DANGERS OF REGULATION THROUGH
LITIGATION: THE ALLIANCE OF PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS AND STATE GOVERNMENTS (2000)
(discussing suits by state attorneys general working together with plaintiffs' lawyers against
tobacco companies, lead paint companies, HMOs, and car rental companies, but also including
private class actions against breast implant manufacturers); Kenneth S. Abraham, The
InsuranceEffects of Regulation by Litigation, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 212, 23132 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (discussing the impact of mass tort litigation on the insurance
industry, noting that both backward-looking and forward-looking litigation can have a
regulatory impact, and stating that from an insurance perspective "every lawsuit is
potentially regulation by litigation"); Gary T. Schwartz, Comment, in REGULATION THROUGH
LITIGATION, supra, at 348, 348 (recognizing that "all tort litigation can be seen as regulation
by way of litigation" but that a narrower view would include mass tort suits against
industries); W. Kip Viscusi, Overview, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, supra, at 1, 1
(describing regulation by litigation as a "new phenomenon" created by recent lawsuits by state
and local governments involving cigarettes, guns, and other products); CTR. FOR REGULATORY
EFFErIvENEss, REGULATION THROUGH PRIVATE LITIGATION-THE SMITHFIELDHAMS LAWSUIT
AS AN ESCALATION OF AN EXISTING TREND, available at http://www.thecre.comlregbylitt
private_20011220.html (recognizing that "regulation through litigation" had been thought to
be limited to cases where government officials contracted with private firms to coerce private
industry to comply with regulatory goals not attainable through the normal regulatory process
but now includes actions by private parties based on state common law involving
environmental contamination); Press Release, Am. Justice Partnership, Illinois Supreme
Court Rejects Regulation Through Litigation in Auto Parts Case (Aug. 18, 2005), availableat
http://www.legalreforminthenews.com/News%20Releases/ATRA-IL-Supreme-Court-8-1805.html (describing the initial certification of a class action against State Farm Insurance
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of "regulation by litigation" has become part of the mainstream
and creates a view of private tort litigation that is squarely in the
"public law" realm. Once tort law is considered as only a form of
public regulation (and improper public regulation at that), it
becomes easier to convince legislators and courts that it must be
stopped. As shown below, this public law rhetoric surrounding
traditional personal injury torts is no longer limited to interest
group politics or scholarly debates, but now also is evident in
judicial decisions reviewing state tort law claims.
2. Tort Reform in the Courts
State courts, for their part, were of course the original tort
"experimenters" when they began to expand the rights of plaintiffs
to recover for the newly discovered and increasing harms caused by
the industrialization and, later, commercialization of American
society.65 State courts continue to involve themselves in traditional
state tort reform both by rolling back earlier expansions of tort law
in some areas and by ruling on the constitutionality of state
statutory reform efforts.66 Indeed, state supreme courts in Alabama,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon,
and Washington, among others, have struck down all or portions
of those states' statutory tort reform measures on grounds that
they violate state constitutional provisions ensuring a right to a
jury trial, equal protection, or separation of powers. 7 Courts in
numerous other states, however, most recently in Ohio, have upheld
statutory tort reform efforts as valid under their state constitutions.68
Company involving nonoriginal equipment manufacturer parts in car repairs as "regulation
through litigation").
65. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
66. See John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort
Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1162 (2005) (explaining that the "current generation of state
constitutional decisions reviewing tort reform legislation is merely the latest incarnation of
what has been almost one and a half centuries of interaction between American constitutions
at the state and sometimes federal levels, on one hand, and the law of torts, on the other").
67. AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N,TORT REFORM RECORD 2-3, 15, 23, 25, 32, 35, 38, 47 (2007),
availableat http://www.atra.orgtfiles.cgi/8140 Record-12-07.pdf(describingjudicial decisions
invalidating and upholding statutory tort reform).
68. See id. at 4, 15, 22, 31, 33, 35; see also Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420
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The debates over tort reform, however, have gone beyond state
legislatures and state courts. For over two decades now, both the
scholarly community and the federal courts have debated the extent
to which the civil justice system is the cause of many of the nation's
economic ills or whether these concerns are overstated to meet the
needs of the business community's tort reform agenda.6 9 Indeed,
scholars such as Kip Viscusi lament the rise of punitive damages
and declare that "punitive damages represent the most visible
symptom of the ills of the U.S. tort system."7 ° Retired Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor similarly wrote in the 1980s that "[a]wards
of punitive damages are skyrocketing" and warned that the threat
of such awards would detrimentally affect the research and
development of new products, pharmaceutical drugs, vaccines, and
motor vehicles.7 1 Others, however, point to empirical data showing
that punitive damages are rarely awarded and have not increased,
on average, over time, with the exception of awards in the business
litigation context."
Regardless of whether the tort "crisis" is real or illusory, by
characterizing the tort system as defective and as mere "regulation
(Ohio 2007) (upholding as constitutional an Ohio statute limiting punitive damages and
limiting noneconomic damages for all but the most serious injuries). Significantly, while state
courts have often upheld plaintiffs' rights to tort remedies, federal courts have shown no
interest to date in finding that plaintiffs have any substantive due process rights to state tort
law claims and remedies. E.g., Montgomery v. Wyeth, 540 F. Supp. 2d 933 (E.D. Tenn. 2008)
(finding no federal due process protections for a plaintiff whose claim against a drug
manufacturer was eliminated by a state statute of repose before she was even eligible to file
it); see also Goldberg, supra note 8, at 527-28.
69. See DOBBS, supra note 11, at 1093-97 (discussing criticisms of the tort system).
70. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive DamagesAwards, 53 EMORY L.J. 1405,
1405 (2004).
71. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. See Klass, supra note 33, at 98-99 (citing various studies and articles on both sides of
the debate over whether there is a civil justice "crisis" involving punitive damages and
noneconomic damages); Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 32, at 1080-85 (summarizing and
explaining data showing significant increase in the amounts of state and federal jury verdicts
in suits brought by businesses against other businesses); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624-25 (2008) (stating that recent studies undercut most of the
criticism mounted against punitive damages, that the median ratio of compensatory to
punitive damages has remained less than 1:1, and that there has not been a marked increase
in the percentage of cases in which punitive damages have been awarded over the past several
decades, although there are "outlier" cases that subject some defendants "to punitive damages
that dwarf the corresponding compensatories").
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through litigation," commentators and courts treat tort law as
invalid "public law" that has gone astray, rather than a private law
system worthy of protection by the courts and legislatures. Putting
aside the public law rhetoric that surrounds traditional state tort
law, the fact remains that these claims still have significantly more
private law characteristics than public law characteristics. First,
these claims are generally brought by private parties against other
private parties. Second, these claims generally involve primarily
private wrongs rather than public wrongs. Third, the plaintiffs, in
these claims, are not acting as vicarious agents for the state, but are
pursuing their own rights, if they choose to do so, to obtain private
redress for wrongs. Thus, traditional state tort claims fall on the
private law side of the continuum despite often meeting public law
goals of deterrence and compensation as well.
B. Tort Expansions: The Creation of New Rights and Remedies in
Consumer Protection,Privacy, Publicity,and Environmental
Protection Cases
This Section focuses on state legislative and judicial expansions
of state tort rights and remedies in the areas of consumer protection, privacy, and environmental protection. Although these developments are in no way hidden, they are rarely, if ever, recognized
simply as "tort law" and more often are organized under headings
of consumer protection law, intellectual property law, and environmental law. These developments, however, are tort experiments in
the same vein as traditional tort reform in that they provide private
parties with new rights to recover for new types of harm, and create
liability for those who would interfere with those newly-created
rights. Thus, despite being parts of separate fields, the creation of
new consumer protection, privacy, publicity, and environmental
actions that establish liability, damages, and other relief, are forms
of tort law, and their developments count as tort experiments.
Throughout the discussion, this Section highlights both the private
law and public law aspects of these torts.
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1. Tort Expansions in Consumer ProtectionLaws
Modern consumer protection law grew out of the perceived need
to reform the common law for consumer transactions. Prior to
reform, the law took the approach that buyers and sellers were
equally able to judge the quality of goods and thus if the buyer did
not receive what he or she expected from the transaction, the
doctrine of caveat emptor (buyer beware) would apply. 3 As consumer goods and society in general became more complex, and
buyers and sellers more remote, Congress and state legislatures
began to recognize that buyers were not able to protect themselves under traditional contract law and thus required statutory
protection. 4 In 1975, Congress strengthened the Federal Trade
Commission Act, giving the FTC industry-wide rulemaking power,
and, around the same time, state legislatures increasingly began
to enact '"little FTC Acts' prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade
practices, and, significantly, providing private rights of action for
injured consumers."7 " By 1980, however, Congress reduced the
FTC's power in response to the perception the agency had gone too
far.76 As a result of this federal inactivity, state legislatures became
even more active in consumer protection matters, passing legislation on new and used car warranties, mobile homes, and consumer
services." More recently, with the mortgage foreclosure crisis in full
swing, state legislatures are again taking the lead and enacting new
legislation to protect consumers from predatory lending, foreclosure
scams, and other harmful activities by banks and lenders.7 A
significant part of state legislation in this area expands tort rights
and remedies to protect consumers. For instance, "[a] private right
73. See DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 1:1 (2006).

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. For instance, in the FTC Improvements Act of 1980, Congress imposed a
congressional review of all FTC trade regulation rules and placed a three-year moratorium
on FTC rules regulating unfair advertising. Id. § 8:2 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(1)). The
congressional veto portion of the legislation was subsequently held to be unconstitutional. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Emily Jeffcott, The Mortgage Reform and Anti PredatoryAct of 2007: Pavinga
Secure Path for Minorities in the Midst of the Subprime Debacle, 10 SCHOLAR 449, 468-70
(2008); Seth Yaffo, Comment, Beware the Dotted Line: Foreclosure Rescue Fraud and the
Growing Effort To Combat It, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 113 (2007).
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of action to sue for alleged violations of the state consumer protection act currently exists in every state except Iowa and North
Dakota."79 In bringing such actions, if a plaintiff establishes
causation, he or she generally can recover compensatory damages
and/or rescission damages.8 0 In some states a plaintiff can also
recover emotional distress damages, physical pain and suffering
damages, consequential damages, and injunctive relief to enjoin
future violations."1 In addition, at least eighteen states allow successful consumer plaintiffs to recover minimum damages (ranging
from twenty-five to two thousand dollars) to encourage plaintiffs to
litigate consumer protection violations, a similar number authorize
double or treble damages to successful plaintiffs, and several states
allow punitive damages in particularly egregious cases. 2 Most
states allow plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees incurred in bringing
a successful action under their consumer protection statutes. 3
Notably, many of the same states that have enacted the most
restrictive limits on punitive damages and noneconomic damages
in traditional common law tort suits have expansive consumer
protection statutes allowing those same types of damages for consumer protection violations. For instance, Texas has set stringent
limits on noneconomic and punitive damages in traditional personal injury tort suits against doctors and product manufacturers
but authorizes emotional distress damages and treble damages
under its consumer protection laws.' Likewise, Ohio, which recently
enacted significant tort reform measures for many common law
claims, allows for treble damages under its consumer protection
85
statute.

79. See PRIDGEN, supra note 73, § 6:2.
80. Id. §§ 6:4, 6:8.
81. Id. §§ 6:5-6:7, 6:9.
82. Id. § 6:10.
83. Id. § 6:17.
84. See PRIDGEN, supra note 73, § 6.5 (discussing awards of emotional distress damages
under Texas Consumer Protection Act); id. § 6.12 (showing Texas mandates multiple damages
in cases of intentional or willful conduct by the defendant); see also supra note 50 and
accompanying text (discussing the Texas tort reform legislation).
85. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.09 (West 2008) (allowing private right of action,
compensatory damages, treble damages, and attorneys' fees for successful plaintiffs); see also
supranotes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing Ohio tort reform legislation).
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Moreover, states have not been content simply to leave their
1970s-era consumer protection legislation in place, but instead
have been active in expanding it in recent years by utilizing tort
rights and remedies to address new consumer protection concerns
such as predatory lending. "Predatory lending" occurs where brokers or lenders offer mortgages to high-risk borrowers without fully
disclosing material terms or by changing the loan type or interest
rate as closing approaches.8 6 Such practices increased dramatically
during the past ten years, as restrictions on interstate banking were
removed, allowing banks and lenders to provide a broader range of
credit and financial services to consumers who were not able to
qualify financially for more traditional loans.8 7 Not surprisingly,
many of these subprime borrowers were unable to maintain their
mortgage payments, leading to an increase in home foreclosures
across the country and contributing to a worldwide financial crisis. 8
In response to this crisis in the mortgage industry, states have
begun to fill what they see as a federal regulatory void and use new
and existing consumer protection practices not only to set regulatory limits on predatory lending but also to utilize tort rights
and remedies in their efforts. 9 Since 1999, numerous states have
enacted predatory lending legislation or have brought enforcement
actions against predatory lenders using new and old consumer
protection laws.9" Some of these new predatory lending statutes
86. See Jessica Fogel, State Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative Approach to
Solving the Problem of PredatoryMortgage Lending, 28 SEA"LE U. L. REV. 435, 435 (2005).
87. See Laurie A. Burlingame, A Pro-ConsumerApproach to PredatoryLending:Enhanced
ProtectionThroughFederalLegislationand New Approaches to Education,60 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 460, 460 (2006) (explaining changes in banking regulation that led to changes in the
financial services industry, the increase of availability of credit, and the emergence of
subprime lending); see also Fogel, supra note 86, at 438 (noting that in recent years, the
subprime lending market has witnessed "dramatic growth" with $332 billion in mortgage
loans originating from subprime lenders in 2003, compared to $125 billion in 1997).
88. See Jeffcott, supra note 78, at 450-54 & n.26 (discussing the phenomenon of subprime
lending among low and moderate income borrowers and the effects of such lending which has
"led to a disastrous increase in the rates of foreclosure"); see also Vikas Bajaj & Michael M.
Grynbaum, About I in 11 MortgageholdersFaceLoan Problems,N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at
C1.
89. See Jeffcott, supra note 78, at 468 (citing the "ineffectiveness of federal legislation" as
the reason behind the significant state legislative activity in the area of predatory lending).
90. See Burlingame, supra note 87, at 468-69; see also Fogel, supra note 86, at 454-59
(describing how state consumer protection statutes are often more effective vehicles to prevent
predatory lending practices because they contain private rights of action, prohibit unfair or
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provide for private rights of action by consumers and allow recovery
of a wide range of compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs,
and attorneys' fees.
For instance, in 2007, Minnesota enacted a predatory lending
statute that provides that a borrower injured by the standards set
forth in the law shall have a private right of action for recovery and
the court shall award actual, incidental, and consequential damages; statutory damages equal to the amount of all lender fees
included in the amount of the principal of the residential mortgage
loan; punitive damages if appropriate, consistent with general state
standards on punitive damages; court costs; and reasonable attorneys' fees.9 ' The statute also provides that the remedies set forth in
the law are cumulative and do not restrict any other right or remedy
available to the borrower.9 2 Other states, including Arkansas,
Indiana, New Mexico, New York, and Ohio, have enacted similar
laws protecting borrowers and providing private rights of action to
recover tort-like damages.93
In addition to the legislative creation of new tort rights and
remedies, cities are turning to the courts in hopes of using the
common law tort doctrine of public nuisance to recoup municipal
costs associated with the foreclosure crisis. In 2008, the cities of
Cleveland and Buffalo sued financial institutions under public
nuisance doctrine, arguing that the subprime lenders and the
deceptive practices without requiring proof of fraudulent intent or knowledge, provide for
expansive remedies, and do not run afoul of federal preemption principles).
91. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 58.18 (West 2008).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-53-106 (2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-9-5-4 (West 2008);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-21A-9 (West 2008); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1(6) to (7) (McKinney 2008);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1322.081 (West 2008). Many states are concerned, however, that the
Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1 (2007)-which holds
that Office of the Comptroller of Currency regulations preempt any state law that obstructs,
impairs, or conditions a national bank's ability to exercise power granted to it under federal
law-may preempt state laws regulating predatory lending. See id. at 13-16; see also Julia
Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgagingthe American Dream:PredatoryLending, Preemption,
and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1360-62 (2006) (stating that
judicial preemption of state antipredatory lending statutes will reduce experimentation
among the states and prolong a potential solution to the problem, and arguing that state antipredatory lending statutes are preferable to congressional action because state regulation
allows for experimentation and quick adaptation). For a discussion of federal preemption
doctrine, see infra Part IV.B.
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financial institutions that backed them knowingly contributed to
the current foreclosure crisis in the cities.94 These lawsuits sought
to recoup the cities' lost property taxes as well as the cost of fire
departments, police, code enforcement, demolition, and other services required to deal with the foreclosed properties. 5
These developments show a significant amount of activity in the
states geared toward using tort law as a means to provide a right of
redress for consumers harmed by fraudulent sales practices or
predatory lending practices. Although these torts have significant
"private law" aspects in that they are suits brought by individuals
seeking relief for wrongs done to them by private parties, they also
have significant "public law" aspects. Notably, states enacted these
laws to help fill a federal regulatory gap in consumer protection and
assist state enforcement of the laws.9 6 The fact that most of the state
laws allow for recovery of attorneys' fees, treble damages, and
minimum damages in addition to actual damages shows the states
are using tort law to assist with public regulation. 7 These increases
in state tort rights and remedies in the consumer protection area
stand in contrast to the limits placed on state tort rights and
remedies in the product liability and medical malpractice areas.
Thus, state approaches to tort law are not one-dimensional but
instead demonstrate both expansions and contractions of rights and
remedies along the private law-public law continuum.
2. Tort Expansions in Privacy and Publicity Rights
Another significant area of state tort expansion involves the right
to privacy and the right to publicity. The right to privacy began to
develop in legal scholarship, the courts, and state legislatures at the
end of the nineteenth century.9 8 The modern right to privacy began
94. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, Civ. No. 08-CV-062 (D. Md. filed
Jan. 8, 2008); Cleveland v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., No. CV08646970 (Ct. Com. P1. Ohio filed
Jan. 10, 2008); see also Julie Kay, Empty Homes Spur Cities' Suits, NAT'L L.J., May 5, 2008,
at 1.
95. See Kay, supra note 94.
96. See supra notes 77-78, 89 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 77-78, 89 and accompanying text.
98. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:4 (2d ed. 2003);
see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
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in 1960, when William Prosser created his "four tort" approach to
privacy law. In so doing, Prosser undertook a comprehensive survey
of right to privacy cases and concluded that not one tort, but a set
of four torts, each protecting a different interest, made up the right
to privacy. 9 These four torts were (1) the physical intrusion into
private places, (2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) publicity
falsely attributing to the plaintiff some opinion or utterance, and (4)
appropriating the plaintiff's likeness without consent for business
purposes. 10 The First Restatement of Torts, state legislatures, and
courts across the country adopted this "four tort" approach to the
right to privacy although the right varies from state to state under
both common law and state statutes. 10 1
The right to publicity, which grew out of the right to privacy, has
been defined as "the inherent right of every human being to control
the commercial use of his or her identity."'1 2 Beginning in 1953 with
the Second Circuit, courts began to recognize a common law right to
publicity as a matter of state law either as its own right or as part
of the right to privacy.' As of 2003, courts in eighteen states
state common law and only
recognized the right to publicity0 under
4
two states expressly rejected it.'
In addition to the right under common law, in the 1980s and
1990s, numerous states enacted statutes expressly recognizing
and protecting the right to publicity separate and apart from
the right to privacy that existed in earlier statutes.0 5 California,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Texas, and Washington all enacted statutes during this time period
that expressly recognize property rights in certain aspects of personal identity (such as name, likeness, photograph, or voice), both
during life and post mortem.1 0 They permit recovery of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and/or injunctive relief for a
99. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); see also HENDERSON ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 771.
100. HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 771.
101. Id. at 772.
102. McCARTHY, supra note 98, § 1:3.
103. Id. § 6:3.
104. See id.
105. See id. §§ 6:6-6:8.
106. See id. § 6:8.
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defendant's use of the commercial value of the plaintiff's identity."17
Other states-such as Florida, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York,
Rhode Island, Utah, and Wisconsin-permit recovery of damages
associated with the commercial value of a person's identity, a "major
hallmark" of the right to publicity, but consider these rights to be
part of the right to privacy rather than a property right in personal

identity. 108
The increase in state attention to privacy and publicity laws can
be seen as a direct response to the new challenges in information
privacy and use. The first set of modern privacy and publicity
challenges began in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of the rise of
digital technology, computer databases, and other sophisticated
digital collection of information.10 9 The second set of challenges
arose in the 1990s and 2000s following the Internet explosion.
During that time, there was a significant increase in public access
to personal data and information, as well as an increased ability to
use that personal data and information for commercial gain.110
Thus, state legislatures turned to tort law as one tool in responding
to the public's concern about the use and misuse of technology in the
Internet age.'
Another example of states using tort law to respond to the public's
concern over interference with privacy and publicity rights is the
recent focus on "anti-paparazzi" legislation. In 1998, the California
legislature enacted the California Privacy Protection Act of 1998112
to provide protection against technological intrusion and trespass.' 1'
The legislation redefined the state law of trespass to create new
privacy torts in response to the death of Princess Diana in 1997,
107. See id. §§ 6:4, 6:8.
108. See id. §§ 6:7-6:8. These state law developments have taken place against a backdrop
of federal statutory and constitutional privacy and publicity law beginning in the 1980s. See
CHRISTOPHER WOLF, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW
IN THE INFORMATION AGE §§ 1:4.3-1:5.2, 14:1.1 (Christopher Wolf ed., 2008).
109. See Wolf, supra note 108, at §§ 1:4.3-1:4.4.
110. Id. §§ 1:4.4-1:5.2.
111. Id. § 1:4.4; see also id. § 16:1.1 ("[Ihe most compelling need for a 'right to be let alone'
is, for many Americans, manifested in a desire to avoid unsolicited and unwanted commercial
communications.").
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 2008).
113. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing the Rights of Privacy and the Press: A Reply to
Professor Smolla, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1152, 1153-58 (1999) (discussing the California
legislation).
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which resulted when her car, in an attempt to escape aggressive
paparazzi photographers, collided with a concrete post inside a
tunnel." 4 The first new tort, "physical invasion of privacy" allows a
party to sue for damages or injunctive relief when someone has (1)
"knowingly enter[ed] on to the land of another person without
permission;" (2) the entry was made with the intent to capture any
type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression
of another person engaged in a "personal or familial activity"; and
(3) the invasion was made "in a manner that is offensive to a
reasonable person.""' 5 Under this tort, a plaintiff can recover general
damages, special damages, treble damages, punitive damages,
equitable relief (including an injunction
disgorgement of profits,1 and
6
order).
restraining
and
The second new tort, labeled "constructive invasion of privacy,"
goes beyond physical invasion by providing for liability even without
entry onto the land of another. "Constructive invasion of privacy"
occurs when (1) a person attempts to capture any type of visual
image, sound recording or other physical impression of another
person engaging in "personal or familial activity"; (2) the attempt is
made in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person; (3) there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (4) a "visual or auditory
enhancing device" is used." 7 Liability exists "regardless of whether
there is a physical trespass.""' 8 The full range of relief for physical
invasion of privacy is also available for constructive invasion of
privacy." 9 Holding a defendant liable for "constructive invasion of
privacy" departs dramatically from common law trespass doctrine,20
which has always required a physical entry to establish liability.
114. See Lisa Vance, Note, Amending its Anti-Paparazzi Statute: California'sLatest Baby
Steps in its Attempt To Curb the Aggressive Paparazzi,29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 99,
99-100, 107-08 (2006) (discussing history behind the California law and the contours of the
law).
115. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a) (West 2008).
116. See id. § 1708.8(d), (h).
117. See id. § 1708.8(b).
118. Id.
119. Id. § 1708.8(d).
120. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (stating that a defendant is liable
for trespass if he or she (1) enters the plaintiff's land or causes a thing or third person to do
so, (2) remains on the land, or (3) fails to remove from the land a thing that he is under a duty
to remove); HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 386 (stating that to constitute a trespass,
"the defendant must accomplish an entry on the plaintiff's land by means of some physical,
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In 2005, the California Legislature amended its privacy law to add
assault to the list of activities that constitute invasion of privacy. It
also imposed civil liability for "assault committed with the intent to
capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical
impression."''
Thus, we see state legislatures expanding tort law in response to
citizen concerns over new vulnerabilities in the areas of privacy
and publicity in an age when computers, the Internet, high resolution cameras, and other forms of technology make it difficult to
keep private or retain proprietary rights in our most personal information and attributes. These new torts serve private law goals
by granting state citizens additional "property" rights in their
identities and granting new privacy rights that they can enforce
in court against private actors. These torts also serve public law
goals, however, by creating additional "zones" of privacy that make
citizens as members of the public feel protected from potential
abuses of technology.
3. Tort Expansions in Environmental Protection
Although courses in environmental law still focus primarily on
the numerous federal statutes that, since the 1970s, govern most
aspects of environmental protection, states have in recent years
enacted new statutes and pursued new common law tort theories
for environmental protection purposes. States first took these
actions to augment the federal regulatory structure. More recently,
however, states have enacted environmental protection laws to
respond to what they have seen as a failure of Congress and the
Executive Branch to address critical environmental issues, such
as greenhouse gas emissions ("GHG emissions") that lead to
climate change.'2 2 This subsection focuses on recent state efforts
to use tort law (both statutory and common law) to meet environmental protection objectives, and puts those efforts into their
tangible agency").
121. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1708.8(c) (West 2008); see also Vance, supra note 114, at 108-10
(discussing the 2005 amendment).
122. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Kass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the
Regulatory State, 92 IowA L. REv. 545, 579-80 (2007).
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historical context, which began with Congress's enactment of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA") in 1980.123
In the 1970s, Congress, for the first time, began to enact farreaching legislation to reduce or eliminate air and water
pollution;... govern the generation, storage, and disposal of solid
and hazardous waste; 125 and create a regulatory system to review,
classify, and regulate a host of pollutants and hazardous
chemicals. 126 The most "tort-like" of these federal statutes is
CERCLA, also known as "Superfund."'2 7 Congress enacted CERCLA
in December 1980 in response to a growing concern that past and
current disposal of hazardous substances was significantly impacting human health and the environment. 28 CERCLA's legislative
history is full of facts, statistics, and horror stories justifying the
need for federal legislation to address a major crisis of abandoned
hazardous waste facilities. 29 During the congressional debates,
members of Congress frequently referred to "Love Canal" and
"Valley of the Drums," which were the most publicized of the
thousands of abandoned hazardous waste sites around the country
presenting a threat to human health and the environment. 3 °

123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
124. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000)); Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91
Stat. 1566 (codifed at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000)).
125. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (2000)).
126. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-26 (2006)).
127. "Superfund" refers to the $1.6 billion Hazardous Substances Response Trust Fund
created to finance cleanups. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2000) (establishing Superfund); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(11) (defining "Fund" or 'Trust Fund" under CERCLA); see also SUSAN M. COOKE &
CHRISTOPHER P. DAVIS, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY
(explaining funding for and uses of Superfund).
AND LITIGATION §§ 12.03[3], 12.03[4] [f]
128. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016 pt. I, at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20;
see also Alexandra B. lass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on
Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 924-26
(2004) (noting the toxic waste crisis facing the public).
129. Mass, supra note 128, at 926-27.
130. Id. at 927-28.
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Under CERCLA, anyone who is found to be "responsible"131 for a
release or threatened release 3 2 of a hazardous substance'33 from a
facility' that results in the incurrence of response costs, 135 13is
strictly, jointly, and severally liable for reimbursing those costs.
CERCLA, however, limits recovery by private parties to money
spent on the investigation and remediation of a release of hazardous
substances. It does not allow private parties to recover damages
associated with lost profits, diminution in value to property,
personal injury, lost rents, punitive damages, or other damages
associated with contamination of property or the environment.' 3 7 By
contrast, some state superfund statutes enacted subsequent to
CERCLA, such as those in Alaska, Minnesota, and Washington,
allow recovery for personal injury, lost profits, diminution in value
to property, attorneys' fees, expenses, or other losses stemming from
the contamination of property or harm to human health and the
environment.' 3 8
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (setting forth categories of persons liable under CERCLA for
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility that causes
response costs to be incurred).
132. Id.; see also id. § 9601(22) (defining "release" to include any "spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping,
or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels,
containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant)").
133. See id. § 9601(14) (defining "hazardous substance" to include any substance designated
as hazardous by EPA under CERCLA and/or various other environmental statutes such as
the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, or Solid Waste Disposal Act, and to exclude petroleum
or natural gas).
134. See id. § 9601(9) (defining "facility" broadly to include "any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to
be located").
135. See id. § 9601(25) (defining "respond" or "response"). "Costs of response" incurred by
a private party must be both "necessary" and "consistent with the national contingency plan."
Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
136. Id. § 9607(a).
137. See Kass, supra note 128, at 923.
138. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.822, 46.03.824 (2007) (providing for strict liability, cost
recovery, and broadly defined damages including injury to, or loss of, persons or property, and
costs of containment and cleanup in connection with the release of hazardous substances);
MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.05, 115B.14 (2007) (allowing recovery for personal injury, lost profits,
diminution in value to property, and other damages associated with the release of hazardous
substances, as well as reasonable costs and attorneys' fees); WASH. REv. CODE § 70.105D.080
(2008) (allowing recovery of expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees in connection with cost
recovery actions); FDIC v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 21 P.3d 344, 345 (Alaska 2001) (holding that
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State legislatures enacted these expansive statutes during the
same period they were engaging in traditional tort reform measures
to limit recovery rights in personal injury, medical malpractice, and
product liability cases."i 9 Notably, some states that enacted caps on
economic damages, noneconomic damages, or punitive damages in
traditional tort cases expressly exempted environmental harm from
those caps. For instance, Hawaii law limits damages for pain and
suffering to a maximum award of $375,000, but specifically excludes
from that cap damages in actions involving torts relating to
140
environmental pollution, toxics, asbestos, and products liability.
Nevada law limits punitive damages to $300,000 (if the compensatory damages are less than $100,000) or three times the amount of
compensatory damages (if the compensatory damages are $100,000
or more), but does not apply that cap to actions involving defective
products or the emission, spilling, or disposal of toxic, radioactive,
or hazardous materials or waste.' For its part, New Jersey has
abolished punitive damages in product liability actions against drug
manufacturers except in claims where the cause of harm arises from
the exposure to toxic or hazardous substances.'4 2
There are several possible explanations for why legislatures
expanded environmental torts while at the same time placed
significant limits on "traditional" torts. One, of course, is that
the American Medical Association, the American Tort Reform
Association, and manufacturing interests are more powerful
lobbyists than those representing landfills, industrial operations,
chemical companies, and other sources of pollution (at least on the
state level). Another explanation though is that just as the tort
reform interests groups have been successful in convincing legislatures, the courts, and the public that we are in the midst of a torts
"crisis," environmental groups have been just as successful, since
a state statute imposing strict liability on polluters of hazardous substances provided a
private cause of action for the owner of private property damaged by the pollution); see also
Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.210.1(5) (2007) (providing that any person sustaining injury as a result
of another knowingly accepting or hauling solid waste or demolition waste to a site operating
without a permit may bring a civil action to recover actual and exemplary damages).
139. See supra Part II.A.
140. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 663-8.7; 663-10.9(2) (2007).
141. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (2007).
142. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-6 (West 2000).
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the 1980s, in convincing these same actors that we are in an
environmental "crisis." There is significant sympathy toward doctors
and small businesses with regard to increasing liability and the lack
of affordable insurance to cover those liabilities.'4 3 There is much
less sympathy for traditional "polluters." Indeed, the publicity of
Love Canal and other toxic sites in the late 1970s and early 1980s
began the era of federal environmental regulation in the first place
and also had a significant influence on state legislatures.'4 4 Thus,
environmental protection has been separated from traditional tort
law, and accordingly has been able to expand at both the state and
federal level.
Even more recently, state attorneys general have attempted to
use public nuisance doctrine to obtain wide-ranging damages and
injunctive relief for harm associated with GHG emissions that
contribute to climate change. In July 2004, Connecticut, California,
six other states, and the City of New York sued the electric power
industry1 45 under the tort of public nuisance to curtail the defendants' emissions of carbon dioxide. 14 As relief, the plaintiffs asked
the court to cap carbon dioxide emissions from the power plants and
mandate annual reductions of such emissions. 4 7 Then, in September 2006, California brought its own public nuisance lawsuit against
numerous automakers; it sought damages associated with the
defendants' production of vehicles that create GHG emissions. 4 In
each case, the states brought the lawsuits to respond to the federal
143. See generally Rick Blizzard, Americans Support MalpracticeAward Limits, GALLUP
POLL MONTHLY, Feb. 1, 2003, at 15, available at http://www.gaup.com/poll7705/AmericansSupport-Malpractice-Awards-Limits.aspx (presenting findings that 74 percent of Americans
believe medical malpractice insurance is a major problem with 72 percent supporting limiting
damages for emotional pain and suffering and 64 percent supporting limits on punitive
damage awards).
144. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing events leading up to
enactment of CERCLA).
145. The electric power industry is responsible for significantly more carbon dioxide
emissions in the U.S. than any other industry, contributing 40 percent of total emissions as
compared with 20 percent for cars and light-duty trucks. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2004, at 22 (2005), available at

http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/cdemissions_tbls.html.
146. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
147. Id. at 270.
148. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 606-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
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government's failure to address the growing threat of climate
change and to use their own state tort rights and remedies to obtain
either injunctive relief or damages. 149 According to one of the
attorneys prosecuting the California suit under public nuisance
theory, "[t]he automakers could continue producing cars with GHG
emissions that contribute to global warming and the specific harms
identified in California, but they would be liable for the costs
imposed by those harms. 1 5 °
To date, these public nuisance suits have not met with much
success. In the Connecticut case, the federal district court dismissed
the suit in 2005 on justiciability grounds, holding that the action
raised political questions over how to address global warming better
addressed by the legislative and executive branches. 5 ' The court
stated that "The scope and magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs seek
reveals the transcendently legislative nature of this litigation."'5 2
The case is currently under review at the Second Circuit. In the
California case, the district court dismissed the federal public
nuisance claim on similar grounds, even though the case sought
damages instead of injunctive relief. 153 The court reasoned that
granting relief would require the court to balance the interests of
reducing global warming with economic and industrial developments, and that such policy determinations should "be made by the
political branches, and not this Court."' 54 The court declined to rule
on the state public nuisance claim, dismissing it without prejudice

149. See Kenneth P. Alex, California'sGlobal Warming Lawsuit: The Case for Damages,
in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 165, 166 (Clifford
Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini eds., 2007) ("Both lawsuits were carefully crafted by the
states' attorneys to respond to failures of the federal government to address the growing
threat of global warming.").
150. Id. at 170.
151. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 273-74.
152. Id. at 272.
153. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 at **8-9.
154. Id. at *8.
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for refiling in state court."' 5 The case is on appeal at the Ninth
Circuit.
It may be that these cases will meet with greater success at the
appellate level, and that other similar cases will join them. Indeed,
there has been a resurgence of public nuisance lawsuits in other
areas of environmental protection, including high-profile (but so far
unsuccessful) suits brought by states and local governments against
paint manufacturers in order to obtain injunctive relief and punitive
damages associated with harms caused by lead paint in residential
homes.156 Not surprisingly, these lawsuits have been subject to
criticism as examples of attorneys general abusing their authority
in pursuit of political and other agendas, 5 7 and as classic "regulation by litigation."
On the private law-public law line, the developments in CERCLA
and state law to recover cleanup costs associated with environmental contamination fall toward the private law side. 5 ' It is true that
these statutes were enacted to allow private parties to assist with
the massive problem of remediating hazardous waste sites.'5 9 It is
155. Id. at *16. Although public nuisance suits by states to address GHG emissions have
not been successful to date, a public nuisance suit brought by North Carolina against the
Tennessee Valley Authority involving traditional air pollutants from coal-fired power plants
(such as nitrogen oxide, sulfur dioxide, and particulates) did lead a federal district court to
order the TVA to install additional pollutant control technology on certain TVA plants in
Tennessee. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., No. 1:06CV20, 2009 WL 77998, at *17-19 (W.D.N.C.
Jan. 13, 2009). In reaching its decision, the court noted that "the judiciary has always played
a significant role in the abatement of public nuisances, particularly when such lawsuits are
brought by the United States or by sovereign states." Id. at *2.
156. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus., 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008) (dismissing the state's
public nuisance claim against paint manufacturers); Julie Steinberg, Columbus, Ohio,
Dismisses Nuisance Suit Against FormerMakers of Lead Pigment, 23 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA)
612 (2008) (discussing voluntary dismissals of public nuisance suits by several Ohio cities
against paint manufacturers, as well as the fact that all of the similar suits filed around the
country have been dismissed); Katie J. Zoglin, Getting the Lead Out: The Potential of Public
Nuisance in Lead-Based Paint Litigation, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 149, at 339 (discussing public nuisance suits
brought by states and municipalities to address harms of lead paint in residential buildings).
157. See, e.g., John S. Gray & Richard 0. Falk, 'Negligence in the Air?' Should 'Alternative
Liability' Theories Apply in Lead PaintLitigation?, 35 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 341
(Apr. 2, 2007) (arguing that public officials pursuing public nuisance actions against lead
paint manufacturers are ignoring existing state law and attempting "to create public policy
based on their personal views through judicial decree").
158. See supra text accompanying notes 131-42.
159. See Klass, supra note 128, at 923.
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also true, however, that these laws were enacted to address the
problems private citizens faced in relying on traditional tort claims
of negligence and nuisance where the contamination occurred
decades in the past, making it difficult, if not impossible, to prove
breach of a duty of care or causation."6 Thus, the new torts were
important in giving private citizens new rights to recover for private
wrongs associated with the cleanup of hazardous waste.
The public nuisance suits brought by state and local governments,
however, are certainly examples of public entities using litigation to
advance public law goals. As noted above, these suits have met with
much criticism as a misuse of the tort system. On the other hand,
attorneys general play an important role, not only in enforcing
existing state statutes, but also in using their broad powers to
engage in their own tort experiments under common law.16 ' One can
argue that innovative lawsuits brought by attorneys general under
their state tort law complement state legislative efforts to experiment with tort law in our federalist system.'62 Whether one has a
positive view or negative view of these suits, the fact remains that
they are an example of tort law that is primarily promoting public
law goals to achieve broad change in society at large rather than
enforcing private law rights to redress.
C. Conclusion
These state experiments with tort law likely will not abate any
time soon. States will continue to struggle with where to increase
and decrease tort rights to respond to the needs of their citizens,
the business community, and technological and social advances.
Just as environmental torts expanded in the 1980s to respond to
the growing awareness of environmental harm, we now see states
expanding privacy and publicity torts to provide tailored protections
160. See id. at 928-32 (discussing evidence presented during congressional debates on
CERCLA to justify strict liability).
161. Indeed, state attorneys general are democratically elected in forty-three states and
thus accountable to the electorate. See NATL ASS'N OF Arr'Ys GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 15 (Lynn M. Ross ed., 1990).

162. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, The State Attorney General and Preemption, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW&REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 81,92-95
(William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
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for the Internet age.' 6 3 In expanding and contracting tort law in
various areas, states are using tort law to meet both private law
goals and public law goals, not exclusively one or the other.
Moreover, as state legislatures conduct their experiments, state
courts both conduct their own experiments as well as review the
legislative experiments under state constitutions. The next question, of course, is the role Congress, federal agencies, and federal
courts have played and will continue to play in tort experiments.
III. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES TO STATE TORT EXPERIMENTS
This Part turns to the current tensions between Congress and the
states in the context of tort law. Despite the description of tort law
as an area of "traditional state concern," Congress has long played
a role in displacing state tort law to both increase and decrease
plaintiff rights in the name of promoting national interests. As
early as 1908, Congress enacted the Employers' Liability Act, which
required common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to
compensate employees for damages caused by equipment defects or
negligence of fellow employees, replaced the defense of contributory
negligence with comparative negligence, and eliminated defenses to
liability set forth in employment contracts.' In upholding the
ability of Congress to displace state tort law in this manner, the
Court found that changes in common law liability rules would
promote workplace safety and that Congress had the authority to
determine whether national law "would better subserve the needs
of ...
commerce.' 65
Starting in the middle of the twentieth century, Congress began
to enact numerous laws that granted liability protections for
defendants in certain industries from state tort claims, but along
163. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
164. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000). The Supreme Court upheld the 1908 law after striking
down a similar 1906 law as beyond Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. See The
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1908); The Second Employers' Liability Cases,
223 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1912).
165. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. at 51; see also Perry H. Apelbaum &

Samara T. Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing
the ConstitutionalEnvelope?, 8 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB. POLy 591, 598 (1999) (discussing the
Supreme Court's review of the Employers' Liability Act).
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with that protection, Congress provided substitute remedies for
injured parties. These laws include the Federal Drivers Act of 1961,
which made the Federal Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy for
injuries resulting from operation of a motor vehicle by federal
government employees;16 6 the Price-Anderson Act, enacted in 1957
and amended in 1966, 1975, and 1998, which provided for an
exclusive federal cause of action against nuclear power plants, set
a maximum aggregate liability in the event of a nuclear accident in
exchange for plant operators waiving defenses to liability if sued,
and provided federal compensation from a pool funded by plant
operators; 6 7 the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, which required
employers to provide benefits to coal miners suffering from "black
lung disease" and their families and preempted state workers'
compensation laws in this area;' 6 8 the Swine Flu Act, enacted in
1976, which substituted liability of the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for manufacturers, distributors, and
volunteer medical personnel in connection with the administration
of swine flu vaccine;' 69 the Atomic Testing Liability Act, enacted in
1984, which made action against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act the exclusive remedy for injury or death
due to exposure to radiation from atomic weapons testing by
government contractors; 170 and the National Childhood Vaccine Act
of 1986, which created a no-fault compensation program for
childhood vaccine injury victims to be funded by a tax on each dose
of vaccine. 171 In each of these laws, Congress preempted state tort
claims against the industries or activities to be protected, but
coupled that preemption with a federal system of compensation to
ensure that some aspects of tort remedies were preserved in a
federal forum. In this way, Congress chose to promote national
interests (such as encouraging nuclear testing, nuclear energy
development, or vaccine manufacturing) by eliminating aspects of
tort liability while still recognizing the need for compensation in
cases of harm.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2000).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c), (n)(1) (2000).
30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 247b (1976) (completely revised 1978).
42 U.S.C. § 2212 (2000).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2000).
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Congress began a new wave of targeted tort reform in the 1990s
which included providing an eighteen-year statute of repose for
manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and their component
parts under the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994;172
exempting persons who donate food and grocery products to nonprofits for distribution to the needy under the 1996 Bill Emerson
Good Samaritan Food Donation Act; 17 3 providing liability protections
to individuals who volunteer for nonprofit or government agencies
under the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997;174 limiting compensatory and punitive damages in suits against rail passenger transportation companies under the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act
of 1997; 175 granting suppliers of raw materials and medical implant
component parts the right to be dismissed from product liability
suits if they meet certain contractual and other product specifications under the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998;176 and
providing liability relief and limits on punitive damages for
defendants in legal actions arising from year 2000 computer failures
under the Y2K Act. 177
These laws are notable for at least three reasons. First, like
earlier legislation preempting state tort suits, the federal legislation
of the 1990s is narrowly tailored to protect specific industries or
activities. 178 Second, also in keeping with earlier legislation, these
federal laws are clearly intended to promote activities and indus172. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1791 (2000).
174. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-05 (2000).
175. 49 U.S.C. § 28103 (2000).
176. 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-06 (2000).
177. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-17 (2006).
178. Although Congress has attempted on several occasions to enact national tort reform
legislation limiting state causes of action and damages in products liability actions more
generally, those efforts have so far failed. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 543
(discussing President Clinton's veto of Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of
1996, and later efforts to enact the Product Liability and Reform Act of 1998, which would
have capped punitive damages for small businesses at the greater of $250,000 or two times
compensatory damages, created new statutes of repose and statutes of limitations, and limited
liability generally for various defendants in such actions); Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 165,
at 627-28 (describing the Product Liability and Reform Act's proposal to "narrow the grounds
for the award of punitive damages to those cases where there is a 'conscious, flagrant,
indifference to the rights or safety of others' which can be established by 'clear and convincing
evidence"').
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tries that many would agree are beneficial to society at large (i.e.,
volunteering, providing passenger rail service, encouraging development of computer technology, etc.) in the name of the national
interest.'79 Third, unlike earlier federal legislation preempting state
tort suits, Congress did not see fit to provide any alternative
compensation scheme for potential plaintiffs injured by the industries or activities to be protected. Thus, in the 1990s, we see a shift
away from the idea that Congress should provide a federal substitute when it decides to eliminate state tort lawsuits.
In recent years, federal legislation displacing tort law has
continued to abandon the idea of creating any federal compensation
substitute in place of state tort law and, moreover, has begun to
provide liability protection to more "controversial" industries and
activities. In 2005, Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act, which prohibits virtually all civil liability
actions against manufacturers and sellers of firearms and their
trade associations based on the criminal or unlawful misuse of
guns."1

This legislation was a response to a series of public

nuisance suits brought by municipalities in the early 1990s,
attempting to hold gun sellers, manufacturers, and trade shows
liable under public nuisance theories for gun violence.18 ' In these
cases, local governments and one state (New York) argued, among
other things, that the gun industry knowingly contributed to the
illegal flow of weapons which endangered the health and safety of
179. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6601(a)(2) (2006) ("It is in the national interest that producers
and users of technology products concentrate their attention and resources ... on assessing,
fixing, testing, and developing contingency plans ... so as to minimize possible disruptions
associated with computer failures."); 42 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(7)(C) (2000) ("[I]t is in the interest
of the Federal Government to encourage the continued operation of volunteer service
organizations and contributions of volunteers.....); Rails to Resources Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-570, § 302, 114 Stat. 3043 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 28101-03 (2000)) ("Congress finds that
... rail transportation is an essential component of the North American intermodal
transportation system .... ").
180. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-03 (2006); see also New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d
384, 394-98 (2d Cir. 2008) (dismissing New York City's public nuisance action against gun
manufacturers on grounds that the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act did not
violate the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the First Amendment, or separation
of powers doctrine, and that the Act required dismissal of the lawsuit).
181. See 151 CONG. REC. S9107 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (citing
to the time, expenses, and effort associated with the need for gun manufacturers and sellers
to defend public nuisance suits).
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those living in the plaintiffs' communities.'8 2 Congress enacted the
legislation despite the fact that none of the plaintiffs had prevailed
in court on their claims and despite the fact that over thirty states
had already enacted legislation banning such lawsuits.8 3
Also in 2005, Congress enacted legislation, known as the "Graves
Amendment," that relieved rental car companies from vicarious
liability for accidents caused by rental car drivers by preempting all
state laws that impose such liability." 4 Eliminating this type of
vicarious liability, traditionally available under state law, without
replacing it with any federal system of compensation or regulation,
will undoubtedly leave some injured drivers without a historic right
to redress under state law.
Indeed, one lower federal court, which invalidated the Graves
Amendment on Commerce Clause grounds, cited just that failure to
replace state tort law with some sort of federal compensatory or regulatory system, in order to distinguish the Graves Amendment from
prior legislation held constitutional, such as the Price-Anderson
Act. 8 5 Other federal courts, however, have upheld the law as within
Congress's Commerce Clause authority despite its failure to replace
state tort law with any substitute system of compensation.' 86 In one
decision, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the Graves Amendment was "novel" in that its purpose and effect was not to regulate
the rental car market generally, but solely to preempt state tort law
claims.'8 7 Indeed, the court found that the only other federal statute
with this same purpose and effect was the Protection of Lawful

182. See, e.g., Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1108 (Inl. 2004).
183. Thomas 0. McGarity et al., The Truth About Torts: Lawyers, Guns, and Money (Ctr.
for Progressive Reform, White Paper No. 603, July 2006); see Crouse, supra note 54, at 1357.
In response to the filing of these suits, some gun dealers and distributors entered into
settlement agreements with various states and cities in which the gun industry agreed to
reform various manufacturing and distribution practices. See Crouse, supranote 54, at 1356.
184. See Graves Amendment to the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, 49 U.S.C. § 30,106 (Supp. 2005). For a discussion of the
Price-Anderson Act, see supra note 167 and accompanying text; infra notes 329-30 and
accompanying text.
185. See Vanguard Car Rental Co. v. Huchon, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1380-81 (S.D. Fla.
2007).
186. See Garcia v. Vanguard, 540 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2008); Flagler v. Budget Rent A Car
System, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 557, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
187. See Garcia,540 F.3d at 1252.
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Commerce in Arms Act.'8 8 Despite the novelty of these types of
statutes, however, the court held there was "no reason in principle
why state laws or lawsuits cannot themselves constitute a burden
on interstate commerce."" 9
This most recent federal legislation differs from that which
preceded it. With the earlier legislation, there appeared to be an
attempt to balance the need for compensation with the need to
promote industries or practices that were important to the national
economy and national community. Although one can argue over
whether it was necessary to displace state tort liability to promote
nuclear energy, that debate was softened somewhat by the creation
of a federal compensation scheme. One can also argue over whether
eliminating state tort liability for nonprofit volunteers will create
more volunteers, but most will agree that additional volunteers are
a good thing. The same cannot be said as easily for legislation that
immunizes the gun industry or the rental car industry from state
tort liability. Thus, there has been an increasing readiness on the
part of Congress to displace state tort law without the existence of
a clear national interest and without creating any real substitutes
for compensation or regulation.
In these cases though, the question is not whether Congress
intended to eliminate state tort law (that is made clear in the
legislation), but whether Congress has the authority to do so. In
other cases, however, the issue is whether Congress intended to
eliminate state tort law at all. In these cases, Congress has decided
to regulate in an area historically within the purview of state law,
and the question becomes how much state law Congress intended to
leave intact. This raises separate issues of federalism, including
federal preemption doctrine and substantive due process rights,
which are discussed in the next Part.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERALISM, AND TORT LAW

This Part analyzes U.S. Supreme Court decisions that consider
limits on state tort law under doctrines of federal preemption and
188. Id.; see also supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Protection of
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act).
189. Id.
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substantive due process. Inevitably, in each of these substantive
areas of constitutional law, the Court is forced to consider basic
principles of federalism in the context of tort law. Notably, after
more than one hundred years of minimal involvement in reviewing
state tort law the Court has in the past two decades been increasingly willing to allow Congress and federal agencies to override
state tort law as a matter of constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and agency deference. Also, this closer scrutiny of state tort
law began at approximately the same time the Court was otherwise
cutting back on the authority of Congress over the states under the
Commerce Clause and principles of state sovereign immunity as
part of its "federalist revolution" of the 1990s. Thus, while limiting
congressional authority in the name of federalism and states' rights,
the Court also began imposing more federal restrictions on state tort
law through the preemption doctrine and due process limits on
punitive damages.
Section A provides a general introduction to federalism principles
and discusses specifically the Court's use of these principles in the
1990s to invalidate congressional authority over the states under
the Commerce Clause to regulate in areas of public health, safety,
and other areas of traditional state concern. Section B then
considers the Court's retreat from these same federalism principles
in cases involving federal preemption of state tort law. Section C
discusses the Court's foray into the realm of state punitive damages
and its increasing use of federal substantive due process to place
significant limits on this area of state tort law. This Part concludes
with some observations about the Court's perceptions of tort law
and its role in policing state tort law.
A. The Supreme Court's FederalismJurisprudence
The U.S. Constitution sets out a system of "dual sovereignty"
between the federal government and the states.19 0 Thus, the federal
government has enumerated powers that are limited in scope but
are supreme within its realm of authority, whereas the states have

190. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating Congress's powers); U.S. CONST. amend. X
(reserving unenumerated powers to the states).
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residual broad and plenary powers. 191 Moreover, apart from the few
areas in which the Constitution grants the federal government
exclusive authority, there are many areas that are subject to
92
concurrent and overlapping federal and state regulation.' This
federalist system assures
a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for
more innovation and experimentation in government; and it
makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry." 3
One of the broadest of Congress's enumerated powers is the
power to regulate interstate commerce under Article I, Section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution.'9 4 From the time of the New Deal until the
1990s, the Supreme Court approved far-reaching legislation governing all aspects of civil society, including housing, environmental
protection, and discrimination in employment-based on the theory
that these activities had a "substantial effect" or "cumulative effect"
on interstate commerce.' 9 5 Beginning in the 1990s, however, the
Court, under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, began to alter the
balance of power between the federal government and the states
by reigning in congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.
In 1995, in United States v. Lopez, 196 and in 2000, in United States
v. Morrison,'97 the Court for the first time in sixty years struck down
191. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
192. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 225 (2000) ("The powers of the
federal government and the powers of the states overlap enormously. Although the
Constitution makes a few of the federal government's powers exclusive, the states retain
concurrent authority over most of the areas in which the federal government can act."); see
also Morrison, supra note 162.
193. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
194. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress shall have the power to
regulate commerce "among the several states").
195. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 811-15 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing Supreme Court decisions expanding congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause during this period).
196. 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (involving a federal statute imposing criminal sanctions for
possessing a gun near a school).
197. 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (involving a federal statute providing a federal civil
damage remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence).
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federal legislation as exceeding congressional authority.'9 8 In Lopez,
the Court held that a federal law imposing criminal sanctions for
possessing a gun near a school did not regulate an economic activity
and was not in any way connected to interstate commerce, and thus
did not have a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce sufficient
to allow regulation under the Commerce Clause.'9 9 In Morrison, the
Court found that the regulation and punishment of intrastate
violence against women was not economic activity, "has always been
the province of the States," and that Congress could not regulate it
under its Commerce Clause authority. 0 0
Although these cases brought much talk of a new federalism
"revolution" or "revival,"2 '' subsequent cases, namely Gonzales v.
Raich, °2 refused to place additional limits on Congress's Commerce
Clause authority.2 ' Nevertheless, the focus on states' rights and
limited federal authority in Lopez and Morrison has made a
significant mark on the federalism landscape.
Moreover, during the same time period the Court decided Lopez
and Morrison, it also placed new and significant limits on the ability
of Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity and make states
amenable to private lawsuits in state and federal courts. First, in
1996, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,°4 the Court held that Congress
lacked the power under Article I to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity from suits brought in federal court. Then, in 1999, in
Alden v. Maine,0 5 it held that Congress could not subject states to
suits in state court without state consent. Taken together, these
198. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 264 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that "[b]etween 1936 and April 26, 1995, the
Supreme Court did not find one federal law unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of
Congress's commerce power").
199. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
200. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
201. See Richard H. Fallon, The "Conservative"Pathsof the Rehnquist Court'sFederalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429,430 (2002) (stating in 2002 that commentators have referred
to a federalism "revival" while law reviews have discussed "whether the Court has yet
achieved, or is likely to effect, a federalism 'revolution"'); see also supra note 6.
202. 545 U.S. 1, 32 (2005) (holding that Congress had the authority under the Commerce
Clause to prohibit the cultivation and possession of small amounts of marijuana for medical
purposes).
203. See Sullivan, supra note 6, at 800, 808 (explaining how the Rehnquist Court
"conspicuously failed to extend the federalism revival to its logical limits").
204. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
205. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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Commerce Clause and sovereign immunity cases seemed to herald
an expansion
of "judicially enforced limitations on national authority. 206
For purposes of this Article, what is most relevant about these
federalism cases is the Court's discussion in its Commerce Clause
cases (generally in concurrences and dissents) regarding the
increasingly intertwined relationship between the federal and state
governments in what were once areas of traditional state concern.
For instance, in Lopez, Justice Kennedy joined the majority but
wrote separately to discuss "the significance of federalism in the
whole structure of the Constitution. ' 20 7 He highlighted the idea that
the Constitution divides authority between two governments-state
and federal-to provide more liberty by providing two distinct and
discernable lines of accountability--one between the citizens and
the federal government and the other between the citizens and
the states.20 8 If the federal government were allowed "to take over
the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern ...
the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority
would blur" and would reduce political accountability. 20 9 He went on
to recognize that most states, and most individuals, would argue it
is good public policy to prohibit guns in or near schools. 21" Nevertheless, the issue was one for the states, not for Congress, because
federalism supports the idea that "the States may perform their
role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions
where the best solution is far from clear., 21" Thus, Justice Kennedy's
vision of federalism, at least in Lopez, was based on the idea of
separate "spheres" of regulation between the federal and state
governments, with any increase in federal authority necessarily
diminishing that of state authority.
By contrast, Justices Souter and Breyer described a different
vision of federalism in their respective dissents in Morrison. In
that case, Justice Souter argued that today's integrated, national
206.
(2004).
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms,83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 581.
Id.
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economy renders the idea of separate spheres of federal and state
influence "incoherent," and that state sovereign interests are better
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system than by 'judicially created limitations on federal
power."'2 12 He then placed great weight on the fact that the states
themselves overwhelmingly supported the federal law in question
as "a federal civil rights remedy aimed exactly at violence against
women, as an alternative to the generic state tort causes of action
found to be poor tools of action by the state task forces. 213 Thus, it
was "not the least irony of these cases that the States will be forced
to enjoy the new federalism whether they want it or not."2 '4 Justice
Souter concluded by stating that the federalism of "some earlier
time" cannot account for today's integrated national commerce and
the modern political relationship between the federal government
and the states.2 15 In other words, the days of "separate spheres" are
over and the Court must begin to recognize that in its federalism
jurisprudence. Justice Breyer struck a similar note in his dissent,
in which he focused on how Congress followed procedures to protect
"the federalism values at stake" and tailored the law to prevent its
use in areas of traditional state concern such as divorce, alimony,
and child custody.2" 6 Justice Breyer saw the law as "an instance, not
of state/federal conflict, but of state/federal efforts to cooperate in
'
order to help solve a mutually acknowledged national problem."2 17
These opinions show that states do not always relish their
increased "authority" arising from the limits Lopez and Morrison
placed on Congress's power to assist states in battling social ills
such as guns in schools and gender-motivated violence.2" ' Indeed, in
similar areas, such as environmental protection, cases that limit
the ability of Congress to regulate and protect intrastate wetlands
212. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 646-47, 650 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985)).
213. Id. at 653-54.
214. Id. at 654.
215. Id. at 655.
216. Id. at 661-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 662.
218. See, e.g., REDEFINING FEDERALISM: LISTENING TO THE STATES IN SHAPING "OUR
FEDERALISM" 1 (Douglas T. Kendall ed., 2004) [hereinafter REDEFINING FEDERALISM] ("In the
last decade, the Supreme Court has reworked significant areas of constitutional law with the
professed purpose of protecting the dignity and authority of the States, while frequently
disregarding the States' views as to what federalism is all about.").
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and other state environmental amenities simply result in the states
having less funding and other resources to do the job--especially in
an age in which so many of these issues cannot be placed easily into
separate state and federal spheres of influence.21 9 Thus, even when
states welcome federal assistance for their efforts to protect public
health and the environment, the Commerce Clause cases show the
Court foreclosing such help, ironically in the name of states' rights.
B. The Supremacy Clause and Preemption
While the Court invoked principles of federalism and states'
rights to limit congressional authority to help the states protect
their citizens in public health and safety areas, the Court simultaneously limited the ability of states to allow their citizens to seek
private redress for harm using state tort law through federal
preemption. The doctrine of preemption is based on the Supremacy
Clause in the U.S. Constitution, which declares the Constitution
and U.S. laws "shall be the supreme law of the Land" notwithstanding any state law to the contrary.2 2 ° Courts find preemption where
(1) Congress preempts state law by saying so in express terms
(express preemption); (2) Congress and federal agencies create a
sufficiently comprehensive federal regulatory structure in an area
in which the federal interest is so dominant that it allows the
inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state
regulation (implied field preemption); or (3) Congress has not
completely displaced state regulation in a specific area but the state
law at issue actually conflicts with federal law or the state law
219. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738-39 (2006) (discussing the outer
limits of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate wetlands
pursuant to the Clean Water Act); Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
172-74 (2001) (rejecting a request for "administrative deference" in reading the Clean Water
Act to avoid usurping "the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use");
REDEFINING FEDERALISM, supranote 218, at 27 (contending the states "do not view formalistic
limits on federal power as essential to state liberty" and have "overwhelmingly supported
federal laws necessary to combat national problems such as violence against women and
pollution of our air and water').
220. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding"); see also Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
152 (1982) (stating that the preemption doctrine "has its roots in the Supremacy Clause").
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"stands as an obstacle" to achieving the full purposes and objectives
of Congress (implied conflict preemption). 221 For all three types of
preemption, under principles of federalism, the Court applies a
presumption against preemption when Congress is regulating in
areas of traditional state concern, which include state affirmative
regulation and common law claims for relief in areas of public
health, safety, and environmental protection.22 2
In 1992, the Court held in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 223 that
a smoker's claim for damages against a cigarette manufacturer
under a failure-to-warn theory was preempted by section 5(b) of the
Public Health Smoking Act of 1969, which prohibited state regulation of advertising or promoting cigarettes labeled in conformity
with federal law.224 In finding preemption, the Court found the
phrase "[n]o requirement or prohibition" in the statute's express
preemption clause did not distinguish between positive regulatory
enactments and common law claims for damages.2 25 The Court reasoned that '[t]he obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is
designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy."'226
The Court appeared to leave some room for state tort law a few
years later in Medtronic v. Lohr.22 7 In that case, a plurality of the
Court rejected the argument that FDA regulations that streamlined
the approval process for certain medical devices (the 510(k) process)
under the Medical Device Act (MDA) preempted state common
law claims for damages against a medical device manufacturer.2 2
The Court focused on the importance of state tort law in finding
221. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); Nelson, supra note 192, at 226-28
(discussing the three types of preemption).
222. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) ("[B]ecause the States
are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does
not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action."') (quoting Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996)); HillsboroughCounty, 471 U.S. at 715 (discussing"presumption that state or local
regulation of matters related to health and safety is not invalidated under the Supremacy
Clause").
223. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
224. Id. at 524.
225. Id. at 521.
226. Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)).
227. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
228. Id. at 501-02.
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Congress could not have meant to preempt state common law claims
for damages in its provision prohibiting states from establishing any
"requirement" for a medical device different from or in addition to
any requirement established under the MDA.229 The Court found it
would be difficult to believe that "Congress would have barred most,
if not all, relief for persons injured by defective medical devices"
without saying so explicitly, particularly where there was no
explicit or implicit private right of action under the MDA.23 ° To
adopt the defendant's interpretation of the preemption provision
"would require far greater interference with state legal remedies,
producing a serious intrusion into state sovereignty while simultaneously wiping out the possibility of remedy for the Lohrs' alleged
' Thus, in finding
injuries."2 31
no preemption, the Court focused on
both state sovereignty and the private right to redress in leaving
room for state tort law within a federal regulatory scheme.
In 2000, however, the Court held in a 5-4 decision in Geier v.
American HondaMotor Co.232 that a defective design claim based on
lack of driver's side airbags was subject to implied conflict preemption under the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act.233 The Court
reasoned that allowing common law tort suits would impede the
accomplishment of federal objectives to develop a mix of alternative
passive restraint devices rather than mandating airbags in all
cars.23 4 It reached this holding despite a statutory savings clause
stating that compliance with a federal safety standard did not
exempt a defendant from liability under state common law.23 5 In
that case, not surprisingly, the majority did not focus on any
distinction between state regulation and tort claims to recover compensation for harm as part of the preemption analysis. Instead, it
was the dissent that looked to principles of federalism and warned:
"[T]he Supremacy Clause does not give unelected federal judges
carte blanche to use federal law as a means of imposing their own
' The dissent focused on the
ideas of tort reform on the States."2 36
role
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 488-89.
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
Id. at 864-65, 874-75.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of the states as "separate sovereigns in our federal system" noting
the Court has
long presumed that state laws-particularly those, such as the
provision of tort remedies to compensate for personal injuries,
that are within the scope of the States' historic policy powers-are not to be pre-empted by a federal statute unless it is
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do so." 7
The Court continued to narrow the role for state law in areas
governed by federal regulation in its 2001 decision in Buckman Co.
v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee.8 8 In that case, the plaintiff sued a
regulatory consultant to a manufacturer of orthopedic bone screws,
alleging that the FDA would never have approved use of the bone
screws in the absence of fraudulent representations by the consultant."9 The plaintiff included a state common law misrepresentation claim entitled "fraud-on-the-FDA," which alleged the defendant
made specific fraudulent representations to the agency during the
device approval process.24 ° In reversing the Third Circuit's rejection
of a preemption defense, the Court carved out an "exclusive" federal
interest in considering the consultant's implied preemption defense.24 ' Rather than describing the case as one involving the state's
traditional interest in protecting the health and safety of its
citizens, the Court defined the case as one involving "[p]olicing fraud
against federal agencies," which is "hardly 'a field which the States
have traditionally occupied."'2 42
In 2005, however, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences,2 ' the Court made
some of its strongest statements about the need to preserve state
private rights of redress under principles of federalism in cases
involving preemption. In that case, peanut farmers sued for breach
of express warranty, strict liability, negligence, and violation of the
237. Id.

238. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
239. Id. at 343.
240. Id. at 346-47; see also In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817,
821-22 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing the elements of the plaintiff's fraud-on-the-FDA claim), rev'd
sub nom, Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
241. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352 (pointing to "clear evidence that Congress intended that the
MDA be enforced exclusively by the Federal Government") (citing 21 U.S.C. § 337(a)).
242. Id. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
243. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
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state's deceptive trade practices act in connection with crop damage
caused by the defendant's herbicide.24 4 The defendant argued the
federal pesticide law preempted the claims based on the law's
express preemption clause, which provides that states shall not
impose or continue in effect "any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those required under this
' In finding
subchapter."2 45
the preemption clause did not prevent the
state claims for damages, the Court held the prohibitions in the
federal law apply only to "requirements," and only to requirements
related to "labeling or packaging" that are "in addition to or different" from those required under federal law.24 6 Thus, "an event,
such as a jury verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is
not a requirement" and is not within the scope of the preemption
clause.24 7 The Court found that the "long history of tort litigation
against manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the
basic presumption against preemption" and that Congress would
have expressed its intent more clearly if it "had intended to deprive
injured parties of a long available form of compensation."24' 8 The
Court also recognized that state tort suits for injuries "may aid in
the exposure of new dangers associated with pesticides" and may
lead manufacturers or the EPA to add more detailed labeling to
their products.24 9
Since Bates, the Court has continued to struggle with its preemption jurisprudence and the extent to which citizens may rely on
state statutory and common law to obtain relief from federally
regulated defendants. During its 2007 October Term, the Court
granted certiorari in four separate cases involving federal preemption of state tort claims for relief.25 ° The Court issued opinions in
244. Id. at 434-36.
245. Id. at 436; see 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000).
246. Bates, 544 U.S. at 443-44 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
247. Id. at 445.
248. Id. at 449 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
249. Id. at 451.
250. See Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249, 2009 WL 529172 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2009) (holding that
state law tort claims against a drug manufacturer are not preempted merely because the
manufacturer complied with FDA labeling requirements); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128
S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curiam) (affirming, by an equally divided court, a lower court decision
finding no preemption of fraud exception to state regulatory compliance defense for drug
manufacturers); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (holding that the FDA's premarket approval (PMA) process for medical devices established federal requirements that
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three of the cases (Riegel v. Medtronic,Altria Group v. Good, and
Wyeth v. Levine), and split 4-4 without decision in the other." 1 Most
recently, the Court held in Wyeth v. Levine that state tort law claims
against a drug manufacturer are not preempted merely because the
manufacturer complied with FDA labeling requirements.25 2
In Riegel, the Court held in an opinion by Justice Scalia that the
MDA premarket approval (PMA) process-unlike the 510(k) process
at issue in Medtronic v. Lohr--established federal "requirements"
that preempted the plaintiff's state common law claims for relief.253
Notably, for the first time, the Court stated unequivocally that
absent other indication by Congress, state common law actions for
damages under theories of negligence and strict liability impose
"requirements" for purposes of preemption clauses like that in the
MDA" 4 Moreover, the Court took a very different view of the role
of state tort law than was expressed in Lohr or Bates. In those prior
cases, in opinions by Justice Stevens, the Court hailed the important benefits of state tort law such as providing redress for injury,
generating more information regarding products, exposing new
harms, and encouraging the development of safer products.2 55
In Riegel, by contrast, the Court described state tort law as a force
that "disrupts the federal regulatory scheme no less than state
regulatory law" and is in fact "less deserving of preservation" than
state regulation, which is often based on cost-benefit analysis
similar to that used by the experts at the federal agency.25 6 Thus, in
Riegel, the Court expressed a view that completely equated tort law
served to preempt state law product liability claims against the medical device manufacturer);
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act does not preempt a smoker's fraud claims against makers of light
cigarettes brought under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act).
251. See Warner-Lambert, 128 S. Ct. at 1168 (affirming, by an equally divided court, a
lower court decision finding no preemption of fraud exception to state regulatory compliance
defense for drug manufacturers).
252. Levine, 2009 WL 529172, at *1.
253. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008-10.
254. Id. at 1007-08 (citing plurality opinions and concurring opinions in earlier preemption
decisions); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2006) (providing that no state or political subdivision
may establish or continue in effect with respect to a medical device for human use any
requirement which is different from or in addition to any requirement applicable under this
chapter to the device).
255. See supra notes 227-31, 243-49 and accompanying text.
256. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008.
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with public regulation (and bad regulation at that), at least for
purposes of interpreting the term "requirements" under the federal
statute at issue.
In Altria Group, the Court considered whether the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (the same statute at issue
in the Court's 1992 Cipollone decision) preempted the plaintiff
smokers' fraud claim against the makers of light cigarettes under
the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.2 57 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
interpreted the express preemption clause of the statute narrowly,
and found that the plaintiffs' statutory fraud claims could go
forward.25 8 In reaching that conclusion, Justice Stevens relied
heavily on the presumption against preemption of state law,
particularly "when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally
occupied by the States. 2 9 Although the bulk of the opinion was
devoted to interpreting the precise language of the statute at issue,
Justice Stevens also noted that the states had long played a role in
regulating deceptive advertising practices and that the Federal
Trade Commission "has long depended on cooperative state
regulation to achieve its mission because, although one of the
smallest administrative agencies,
it is charged with policing an
260
enormous amount of activity.,
While Justice Steven's majority opinion relied heavily on the
presumption against preemption of state law, the dissent, authored
by Justice Thomas, expressly rejected any role for state law in this
area. He contended that since the time the Court decided Cipollone
in 1992, the Court "has altered its doctrinal approach to express
preemption" resulting in a complete rejection of the presumption
against preemption of state law in cases of express preemption.26 '
He proceeded to analyze much of the Court's express preemption
jurisprudence since Cipollone, placing the greatest focus on the
Court's recent decision in Riegel v. Medtronic.26 2 He pointed out that
the Court in Riegel "interpreted the statute without reference to the
presumption or any perceived need to impose a narrow construction
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 544 n.6.
Id. at 555-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 557-58.
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on the provision in order to protect the police powers of the
States.263 Once the presumption was put aside, Justice Thomas
proceeded to analyze the express preemption clause in the statute
at issue and ultimately concluded that it is the federal government that must reach a "comprehensive judgment" with respect to
whether the defendants' claims regarding light cigarettes were
fraudulent rather than "juries on a state-by-state basis., 264 Thus,
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia
and Alito, saw no role for the states to provide either assistance
with public regulatory enforcement or a means of private redress for
wrongs.
Taken together, these cases show significant disagreement
among members of the Court over the role state tort law can continue to play at a time when federal statutes and regulations govern
many product safety areas but do not provide private rights of
action or any other means of private redress for harm caused by the
regulated products. Indeed, there is no private right of action for
damages for violation of the standards set forth in the federal
pesticide law at issue in Bates, the MDA at issue in Lohr, Riegel,
and Buckman, or the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act at issue
in Geier. Part III explained the current trend of Congress to
expressly eliminate state tort law claims for relief without providing
any alternative federal compensation mechanism.2 6 5 In the preemption cases described in this Part, the issue is the extent to which the
Court will interpret the Supremacy Clause so broadly as to eliminate state tort law claims for relief without Congress expressly
saying so by finding the claims are state "requirements" that conflict
with federal law.
As the case law also shows, there is a marked trend in the Court
that increasingly equates tort law with public law regulation rather
than a private law system of redress. In Lohr, the Court noted that
finding preemption would interfere with "state legal remedies" and,
in particular, a remedy for the Lohrs' injuries.2 66 Thus, the Court
described the tort system as a state system of legal remedies for the
redress of private injury. A decade later in Riegel, the Court would
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 557.
Id. at 561.
See supra Part III.
Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488-89 (1996).

1556

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1501

describe the tort system merely as a force that "disrupts the federal
[regulatory] scheme" through imposing "requirements" that fail to
use cost-benefit analysis.2 6 ' Indeed, even in Bates, in which the
Court preserved state law tort claims for relief, it highlighted the
benefits of tort claims to "aid in the exposure of new dangers
associated with pesticides" and "lead manufacturers to petition EPA
to allow more detailed labeling of their products."2 6 These benefits,
of course, are public law benefits more than private law benefits.
Many have complained that the Court's preemption jurisprudence
is unpredictable, inconsistent, and in a "state of utter chaos."2'69
Based on the Court's preemption decisions in the area of tort law
since Cipollone, such criticisms seem justified. This is particularly
true when comparing the importance that a majority of Justices
placed on states' rights and federalism in the Commerce Clause and
sovereign immunity cases with their virtual abandonment of those
principles when it came to state tort law in Geier, Buckman, and
Riegel.27 ° Indeed, it is generally those Justices arguing in favor of
states' rights and federalism in the Commerce Clause and sovereign
immunity cases that were in the majority in Geier, Riegel, and the
other pro-preemption cases.27 '
267. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008).
268. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005).
269. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 14.4, at 896 (2005) (stating that
preemption doctrine continues to "wallow in a state of utter chaos"); see, e.g., Viet D. Dinh,
Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000) ("Notwithstanding its
repeated claims to the contrary, the Supreme Court's numerous preemption cases follow no
predictable jurisprudential or analytical pattern."); Nelson, supra note 192, at 232 (stating
that "[m]odern preemption jurisprudence is a muddle" both as applied to discrete areas of law
and in general).
270. See Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 263 (Richard Epstein & Michael S.
Greve eds., 2007) (noting the voting patterns of the "states' rights" Justices (i.e., Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) in the "classic" federalism cases like Lopez stand in
stark contrast to the voting patterns in the preemption cases in which it is the "liberals" who
favor state law in close cases and the "conservatives" who insist on national power).
271. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinions in Lopez, Morrison,and Seminole Tribe
(joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas). Justice Stevens authored the
opinion in Lohr (in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented). Justice Breyer authored the opinion in Geier (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy). See Fallon, supra note 201, at 471-72 (noting
the Court held state law was preempted in every one of its seven preemption cases during
1999 and 2000 and that four of the Court's five most conservative and generally profederalism Justices found preemption in every case while the four most liberal Justices
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Scholars have come up with varying explanations for these
apparent inconsistencies. Some argue the Court is simply pursuing
a pro-business, antiregulatory agenda, using principles of federalism to strike down progressive federal laws as a violation of state
sovereign immunity or beyond Congress's Commerce Clause authority and using preemption doctrine to do the same with regard
to state law actions for private redress of harm.2 72 Others see some
consistency in the Court's preemption cases based on the position
the relevant federal agency has taken with regard to preemption in
each of these cases.27 3 Indeed, beginning in 2000, federal agencies
like the Food and Drug Administration, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Department of Transportation all began enacting regulations and
regulatory preambles and submitting amicus briefs in the Court's
preemption cases arguing in favor of federal preemption of state tort
law where, for the most part, they had argued against preemption
of state law or simply did not take a position in prior decades.27 4
reached the opposite conclusion).
272. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1313, 1315 (2004) (stating that "what animates
the Rehnquist Court is not a concern for states' rights and federalism" but rather hidden
"value choices to limit civil rights laws and to protect business from regulation"); see also
Fallon, supra note 201, at 429 (concluding that the Court's pro-federalism majority is at least
as "substantively conservative" as it is "pro-federalism" and when federalism and substantive
conservatism come into conflict, substantive conservatism frequently dominates); Young,
supra note 270, at 262 (stating that there is no evidence that the Court's "federalist revivar'
on issues like the Commerce Clause will spill over into preemption doctrine and "the
pervasive scope of federal preemption suggests that the primary threat to state autonomy lies
here").
273. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional
Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449, 455, 465-66 (2008) (arguing the Court's product
liability preemption cases reveal a "distinct pattern" in which, in every case with the
exception of Bates, the Court has adopted the position of the relevant federal agency as to
whether the plaintiff's state law claims should be preempted).
274. Mass, supranote 4, at 1653-57, 1674-76 (discussing dramatic change in federal agency
positions on preemption of state law during the Bush Administration in environmental,
health, safety, and consumer protection areas); Nina Mendelson, A Presumption Against
Agency Preemption,102 NW. U. L. REv.695,695 (2008) (noting that in areas such as homeland
security, pharmaceutical regulation, and automotive safety, federal agencies are increasingly
targeting state tort law and regulatory law for preemption even where the state law is not
expressly targeted by the statutes the agencies administer); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Preemption by Preamble:FederalAgencies and the Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L.
REv. 227, 229-42 (2007) (discussing recent efforts by federal public health and safety agencies
to achieve preemption of state regulations and common law claims for relief through express
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Since 2000, federal courts have struggled with the level of
deference to give such agency interpretations, but a review of the
Supreme Court's case law in this area shows that the Court has far
more often than not adopted the agency's position." 5 Indeed, in
every one of the preemption cases discussed in this section, except
for Bates, the Court adopted the position on preemption the relevant
federal agency had taken before the Court." 6 Should a federal
regulatory agency be given such deference on issues of statutory
interpretation and constitutional federalism? Scholars and courts
will continue to disagree on this point, but the fact remains that
deference to the federal administrative agency in these cases
appears to greatly overshadow any deference or "presumption" in
favor of the states in the area of state tort law.
In sum, there appears to be a growing trend toward using
principles of federal constitutional law to limit the ability of states
to grant their citizens the right to obtain private redress for harm
under tort law. Moreover, the Court's preemption cases also show
a marked trend of viewing tort law as almost interchangeable with
public regulatory law both as to its benefits-as described in
Bates-and as to its shortcomings-as described in Riegel. Such a
view has contributed to the Court's willingness to let federal
agencies replace state tort law with a public regulatory regime, even
when that regime fails to substitute for the private redress components of tort law.
C. Limiting State Punitive DamageAwards Under the Due
Process Clause
The 1990s saw not only the beginning of the Court's efforts to cut
back on state tort remedies through preemption doctrine, but also
the Court's first foray into placing substantive due process limits on
state punitive damage awards. Punitive damages are damages,
other than compensatory and nominal damages, awarded against a
defendant to punish him or her for outrageous conduct and to deter
statements in federal regulations).
275. See Sharkey, supra note 273, at 455, 465-66 (discussing deference to the FDA's
preemption position). See generally Sharkey, supra note 274 (discussing the Court's pattern
in preemption cases of adopting the position of the relevant federal agency on preemption).
276. See Sharkey, supra note 274, at 471.
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the defendant or others similarly situated from engaging in such
conduct in the future.27 7
As discussed in Part II, states have been active in recent years in
placing statutory restrictions on the amount of punitive damages a
jury can award plaintiffs in various types of tort actions. Although
empirical studies tend to show that punitive damages are awarded
in less than 10 percent of all cases where plaintiffs prevail on the
merits (and in 1 to 4 percent of all civil actions filed), recent punitive
damage awards in the millions and billions of dollars against
tobacco companies and other product manufacturers have made
headlines, creating a perception that punitive damages are "out of
control" and must be "reigned in. 278
Until recently, limits on state punitive damage awards were a
matter almost entirely of state law. In 1996, however, in BMW of
North American,Inc. v. Gore,279 the Supreme Court for the first time
struck down a state jury award of punitive damages on grounds that
it violated the defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2" This began a series of Supreme Court decisions
between 1996 and 2007 that were notable for their frequency and
willingness to second guess what had historically been a matter of
state concern. These cases set new "guideposts" for courts to follow
to ensure that punitive damage awards were within constitutional
limits, 281 directed appellate courts to apply a de novo standard in
reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damage awards,2 2 set a
"presumptive" single-digit ratio between compensatory damages and

277. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979).
278. mlass, supra note 33, at 93 (citing studies and debates over punitive damages).
279. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
280. Id. at 585-86.
281. See id. at 574-85 (directing lower courts to provide constitutional review of punitive
damage awards using the following three guideposts: (1) the reprehensibility of the misconduct; (2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages; and (3) the difference
between the punitive damages imposed and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases).
282. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001).
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punitive damages,28 3 and prohibited juries from considering harm
to nonparties in assessing punitive damages.2"
Notably, many of these decisions revealed a strong divide between
those Justices (O'Connor in particular) who expressed the view that
tort lawsuits in general and punitive damages in particular are a
significant societal problem that must be dealt with on a federal
constitutional level,2 85 those Justices (Scalia and Thomas) who do
not believe the Due Process Clause provides any protection against
"excessive" or "unreasonable" punitive damage awards,2 86 and those
Justices (Ginsburg in particular) who believe punitive damages
should be a matter for the states and that the states are addressing
concerns adequately through traditional legislative and judicial tort
reform measures.2 87
This line of cases culminated in the Court's most recent punitive
damages decision, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.28 8 In that case, the
Court reviewed the twenty-year litigation over the 1989 grounding
of the Exxon Valdez oil tanker on Bligh Reef in Prince William
Sound, Alaska, which resulted in the discharge of eleven million
gallons of oil into the Sound and one of the largest environmental

283. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (stating that
"few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will
a lesser
...
satisfy due process" and that "[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial ...
ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due
process guarantee").
284. Phillip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
285. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43, 62 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(calling for more stringent constitutional limitations on punitive damage awards because
juries use them to "target unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial views,
and redistribute wealth" and because there is "an explosion in the frequency and size of
punitive damage awards" that appear to be "limited only by the ability of lawyers to string
zeros together in drafting a complaint" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
286. See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 429-30
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
287. See, e.g., id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that large punitive damage
awards may well support state legislation capping punitive damages but that such caps are
"out of order" in a "judicial degree imposed on the States by this Court under the banner of
substantive due process'); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (rejecting due process limits on punitive damages on grounds that the Court
"unnecessarily and unwisely ventures into territory traditionally within the States' domain,
and does so in the face of reform measures currently adopted or currently under consideration
in legislative arenas").
288. 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008).
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disasters in U.S. history. 8 9 Punitive damages in the case were based
on the fact that Exxon officials knew the ship's captain, Joseph
Hazelwood, was a relapsed alcoholic who was drinking at sea but let
him pilot the Valdez through Prince William Sound nevertheless.2 90
Exxon paid hundreds of millions of dollars to federal, state, and
local governments for environmental damages and $507 million
in compensatory damages (based on a jury award and voluntary
settlements) to commercial fisherman, native groups, and local
governments.2 9' The Supreme Court's review of the case, however,
concerned a federal jury award of $5 billion in punitive damages to
a plaintiff class of fishermen.29 2 In 2006, the Ninth Circuit reduced
the punitive damage award to $2.5 billion, finding that any ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages exceeding five-to-one
violated Exxon's due process rights under the Supreme Court's precedent in this area.2 93
In its decision, the Supreme Court remained committed to its
path of placing firm federal limits on punitive damages, in this case
under federal maritime law rather than the Due Process Clause.2 94
Citing instances of "outlier" multimillion and multibillion dollar
awards in some cases, the Court concluded that punitive damages
are unpredictable and thus unfair to defendants.2 5 The Court then
proceeded to entertain various options. It rejected the idea of additional verbal formulations of standards to guide juries and lower
courts as insufficiently specific to reach an appropriate penalty.2 96
It also rejected maximum penalty amounts because of the high
variability in the types of tort and contract injuries that support
punitive damages.2 97
It then looked to its prior punitive damages jurisprudence in the
due process area, as well as efforts by states to use a quantified
289. See In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077-82 (D. Alaska 2004), vacated,
742 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), amended by 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated
and remanded,sub nom. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008); Klass, supra
note 33, at 122 (discussing facts of the Exxon case).
290. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2613-14.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 2614.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2625-26.
296. Id. at 2627-28.
297. Id. at 2629.
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approach in criminal sentencing cases, and settled on setting a
maximum ratio between punitive damages and compensatory
damages.29 The Court ultimately chose a one-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages because of the large
compensatory damages ($507 million) and the lack of intentional
misconduct by Exxon.2 99 Moreover, even though this case arose in
the context of federal maritime law, the Court's reliance on its Due
Process precedent, as well as its statement in a footnote that a oneto-one ratio might also be the outer constitutional limit in this
case, 300 makes it very likely the case will be applied to state law
punitive damage verdicts.
As in the preemption cases discussed in the previous Section,
what is striking about the Court's efforts to place federal constitutional limits on state punitive damage awards is how markedly it
diverges from the federalism and states' rights rhetoric contained
in the Commerce Clause cases decided during precisely the same
period.30 1 One explanation for this divergence is that the interest
group efforts to paint the state tort system as "broken" has worked
not only in the states, but has influenced the Supreme Court, resulting in the placement of due process limits on punitive
damages.0 2 This is particularly notable because under principles
of federalism, the fact that states themselves have engaged in
significant tort reform in recent years would seem to militate in the
opposite direction-that is, the states are successfully policing
themselves without the need for federal intervention by the Court.
Nevertheless, the Court's recent decisions in the punitive damages
cases show the Court applying very different principles of federalism when it comes to state tort law in general and punitive damages
in particular.
Also, similar to the preemption cases, in the punitive damages
cases, the Court exhibits a view of tort law that focuses exclusively
on its public law aspects." 3 In the preemption cases, the rejection of
298. Id. at 2629-34.
299. Id. at 2633-34.
300. See id. at 2634 & n.28 (stating that the plaintiff class recovery of $500 million is
"substantial" and thus in this case "the constitutional outer limit may well be 1:1").
301. See supra Part IV.B.
302. See supra Part II (discussing the rise of tort reform interest groups).
303. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
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the private law aspects of tort was mostly implicit, °4 whereas in the
context of punitive damages, the Court is very explicit in its
rejection of any private law role for punitive damages. For instance,
in Exxon, The Court concluded that regardless of the various rationales for punitive damages over the years, the "consensus today is
that punitive damages are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct. 3 5 As the Court
has made clear in earlier decisions, retribution and deterrence are
public law goals rather than private law goals. For instance, in its
2007 decision in PhillipMorris USA v. Williams, the Court justified
punitive damages as properly imposed "to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition. 0' °6 In Exxon, the Court went even further and noted the
"obvious" similarities between the interests of punitive damages and
the interests advanced by the criminal law, thus moving punitive
damages even further into the public law realm.0 7
Some tort theorists today, however, have taken issue with the
Court's conception of punitive damages as only serving state public
law interests and argue for a conception of punitive damages that
focuses on private retribution and punishment. John Goldberg has
argued that what is at stake in punitive damages is not the state's
interest in obtaining retribution on behalf of its citizens but the
plaintiff's interest in vindicating his or her rights not to be mistreated. 3 ' Anthony Sebok similarly argues that punitive damages
should be seen as a form of private revenge, 0 9 while Benjamin
Zipurksy characterizes the role of punitive damages as vindicating
a plaintiff's private right to "be punitive."3 1 Likewise, Thomas
Colby argues that punitive damages are punishment for "private

304. Id.
305. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008).
306. 547 U.S. 346, 352 (2007); see also Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (describing punitive damages as '"private fines' intended to punish the
defendant and deter future wrongdoing').
307. See Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2628.
308. John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists(And the Rest of Us): Private Law in
Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 3, 7 (2004).
309. Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IowA L. REv. 957,
1002-29 (2007).
310. Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 151-53
(2005).
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wrongs" to individuals rather than public wrongs to society.3 11 Thus,
there is an alternative view of punitive damages grounded in their
historic role of punishing defendants for the private wrong done to
the plaintiff and granting a right to the plaintiff to inflict private
punishment on the defendant.
Once the conception of punitive damages as a private remedy
rather than a public remedy is lost, as it has been in the Court's
recent punitive damages jurisprudence, it becomes much easier to
scrutinize state punitive damages awards as a matter of constitutional law. If it is the state, rather than private parties, that are
imposing punitive damages, it is no longer inconsistent to have due
process limits on punitive damages without having any corresponding due process rights to punitive damages or any other tort relief.
Indeed, John Goldberg has argued that the Constitution supports
a due process right to a body of law "for the redress of private
wrongs" that "would set judicially enforceable constraints on how
' Whether
legislatures may go about tort reform."3 12
one agrees with
that argument, and the federal courts so far have shown no interest
in recognizing such a right, it highlights the vulnerability of many
aspects of tort law, including punitive damages, once tort law is
seen as an arm of the regulatory state used to achieve state goals
rather than also a unique system of redress to be used by private
citizens to address private wrongs.
V. WHO NEEDS TORT LAW?: FEDERALISM AND STATE TORT

EXPERIMENTS
This Part returns to tort theory and suggests that classifying tort
law as either public law or private law does not do justice to the
diversity of tort experiments states are currently pursuing. Instead,
most of the recent tort experiments to expand or contract tort rights
fall at various points along a private law-public law continuum.
Section A explains how the Court's failure to acknowledge the
private law aspects of tort has led to the inconsistencies between the
Supreme Court's federalism revival and its approach to state tort
311. Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Phillip Morris v. Williams: The Past,
Present,and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at
25-42), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152029.
312. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 527, 626.
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law in its recent preemption and punitive damages cases. Section B
then considers the importance of state tort law within our federalist
system of government.
A. "Public"Tort Law and the Supreme Court
This Section discusses how the Supreme Court has failed to
protect adequately state tort law under the U.S. Constitution
because the Court has shifted almost completely to a view of state
tort law as public law. There is a long history of support for the idea
that the Constitution provides due process protections for the right
to redress from wrongs.313 Based on this history, John Goldberg has
argued that courts have strayed from these protections in recent
years because of the now dominant theory of tort law as an arm of
the public regulatory state rather than a private right to redress.31 4
Once tort law is merely another form of public law "balancing the
benefits and burdens of economic life," then a rational basis test
applies and virtually any state or federal interference with state tort
rights and remedies survives constitutional scrutiny.3 15 Regardless
of whether one supports the idea that the Due Process Clause places
limits on federal or state interference with individual tort rights and
remedies, the fact remains that judicial rhetoric has moved away
from recognizing the private law aspects of tort law.
Moreover, this public law conception of state tort law has led the
Court to exclude state tort law completely from any aspect of its
federalism revolution. Once tort law stops being a private "right" of
citizens and just another means by which the state pursues an
economic or social agenda potentially harmful to business interests,
a new dynamic kicks in that allows federal economic or social
interests (whether put forward by Congress or federal agencies) to
dominate. As shown in Part IV, the Supreme Court has been quick
to abandon the federalism principles espoused so strongly in the
Commerce Clause cases when it comes to displacing state tort law
under principles of federal preemption and federal Due Process
limits on punitive damages. With regard to federal preemption, the

313. See id. at 531-83.
314. Id. at 601-05.
315. Id. at 575-80.
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Court's willingness since Cipollone to treat private tort suits for
damages as equivalent to state-enacted "requirements" or "regulations" subject to preemption shows the Court implicitly classifying
316
all of state tort law as public law without saying so.
The Court's transition to classifying tort law as solely a matter
of public law is most evident in its 2008 opinion in Riegel v.
Medtronic. 3 7' The majority opinion equated common law tort claims
with state statutes and regulations for purposes of finding that both
impose state "requirements" barred by the MDA's express preemption clause.3" 8 Even more strikingly, Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, stated that Congress did not fully appreciate the
scope of the preemption provisions of the MDA when it was enacted
in 1976, and that Congress did not believe state tort remedies
interfered with the development of medical devices. 319 He found,
however, based on Cipollone and the conclusion of five of the
Justices in Medtronic v. Lohr, that there was now consensus on the
Court that "common-law rules administered by judges, like statutes
and regulations, create and define legal obligations," and that some
32
of them qualify as "requirements.""
Thus, Justice Stevens's opinion
made clear that the Court gave a meaning to Congress's use of the
word "requirements" that was inconsistent with what Congress
intended back in 1976 (i.e., it did not include common law claims for
relief). The Court's current meaning, however, is nevertheless
consistent with its now complete acceptance of the idea that all of
tort law is exclusively another form of public law that imposes
requirements on regulated parties rather than also a unique
institution that provides the right to obtain redress for private
wrongs. In other words, it is the Court's current conception of tort
law as public law that allows the Court to displace it more cavalierly
under principles of preemption.
This conception of tort law also helps explain the Court's willingness to scrutinize punitive damage verdicts under substantive due
process principles. Benjamin Zipursky has argued punitive damages
316. See supra Part IV.B.
317. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
318. Id. at 1008.
319. Id. at 1011-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
320. Id. at 1012 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992);
Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (plurality opinion)).
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today have a "hybrid status" in that they are simultaneously about
the plaintiff's private right to "be punitive" and the plaintiff's role
as a private attorney general helping the state to impose criminal
or regulatory punishment as part of a private compensatory
award."' Zipursky highlights the "ambiguity" of punitive damages,
which are in some sense "damages to the plaintiff-victim in a civil
tort action and, in another sense, a fine imposed by the state as
punishment for wrongful conduct and collected by the one who
brought the action. 3 22
It is this hybrid status, and the failure of the Supreme Court to
recognize explicitly this status, that has resulted in the Court's
current punitive damages jurisprudence. Goldberg too has written
that the Court has wrongly focused on the states' interest in
imposing punitive damages for deterrence and retribution purposes
rather than the plaintiff's interest in vindicating his or her rights.32 3
Indeed, the Court no longer acknowledges these private aspects of
punitive damages at all.324 Thus, once again, the Court's adoption of
a public law view of tort allows it to impose a heightened scrutiny
on state tort law under constitutional principles that trump any
deference to states acting in their areas of traditional state concern
to provide citizens with private rights of redress. The next Section
highlights the problems with this approach and proposes some
modest solutions.
B. Where To Go From Here: Why Tort Law?
State tort law today is more dynamic and multifaceted than many
scholars and courts recognize. While states cut back on decades of
common law expansions of tort rights and remedies in product
liability and other personal injury suits, they also create new rights
and remedies for the Internet age. In response to a perception that
Congress and federal agencies are failing to regulate adequately
guns, GHG emissions, and mortgage fraud, some states attempt to
fill the gaps through public nuisance suits as perhaps a crude but
potentially powerful stand-in for regulation. Tort law thus is alive
321.
322.
323.
324.

See Zipursky, supra note 310, at 155-59.
See id. at 129.
Goldberg, supra note 308, at 6-7.
See supra Part IV.C.
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and well as private law while also serving public law goals. The
Supreme Court, however, has taken a wrong turn in implicitly
classifying all tort law as public law, with unfortunate consequences
for states and their citizens who deserve more protection from the
elimination of tort law under principles of federalism." 5 The
placement of all tort law into the public law box has the potential to
hinder significantly the states from serving their historically critical
role as laboratories for democracy,32 6 particularly at a time when the
federal government has been less inclined to provide federal support
in these areas. 2 7
One potential solution is for courts to give a much more explicit
recognition of the important role tort law continues to play in
providing private rights for the redress of private wrongs. It is
perhaps inappropriate to conduct a single analysis of tort law that
covers state public nuisance suits; new private causes of action for
invasion of privacy, right to publicity, or for harm arising from
predatory lending practices; and traditional tort claims to recover
for harm from medical malpractice, battery, fraud, and personal
injury from drugs or other consumer products. Although success by
plaintiffs in all these lawsuits may deter harmful practices and
compensate victims for injuries, the public nuisance suits constitute
public law actions to achieve widespread public goals while the
remaining causes of action for privacy, right to publicity, harm from
predatory lending practices, or personal injury also constitute the
creation of a state structure for citizens to obtain redress for private
wrongs. One must recognize that there is a significant difference
between suits to compensate the public and suits to compensate a
private wrong. Once this distinction is recognized, the question is
what to do with it. What is so special about state tort law that it
should either be preserved or replaced with some other system?
Some answers arise from a review of both the public law benefits
and private law benefits of tort law.
With regard to the public law goals of tort, as explained in Part
I, these goals focus in large part on deterrence and compensation. 8
In the past, Congress often replaced state tort law with an alternate
325.
326.
327.
328.

See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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system of compensation and, in some cases, a regulatory scheme to
address deterrence. The Price Anderson Act discussed in Part III is
an example of a congressional approach to perceived deficiencies in
tort law that combines a no-fault compensation program for nuclear
accidents (funded by a combination of private insurance and
mandatory contributions to a common fund by nuclear operators)
with a limit on total liability for any nuclear accident.32 s Claims for
recovery are brought in federal court; claimants must establish
causation and proof of loss, but liability is strict and there is no
defense of contributory negligence.3 3 °
The National Childhood Vaccine Act and the Black Lung Benefits
Act discussed in Part III are other examples of efforts by Congress
to retain some of the public law benefits of tort (deterrence and
compensation) through federal programs when eliminating traditional common law claims for relief. Although many of these laws
were controversial when enacted and remain so today (often seen as
unwarranted subsidies for the industries at issue),3 31 Congress
attempted in a somewhat sophisticated fashion to address the public
law goals of compensation and deterrence as part of a decision that
tort law was not the best solution to a problem.33 2
This stands in contrast to the Protection of Lawful Commerce in
Arms Act, where tort suits against the gun industry were eliminated
entirely, without any regulatory or compensatory system to address
state and local concerns over the ease with which criminal actors
can obtain firearms.3 33 The same is true for the Graves Amendment
relieving rental car companies from vicarious liability.33 4 Of course,
two acts of Congress do not necessarily create a "trend" that should
cause concern. Yet, these recent enactments still serve as a caution
to courts to consider the public law benefits of tort, as well as the
benefits of state experimentation, before upholding such legislation
as within Congress's authority.
329. See supra Part III; see also Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass
Toxics Administrative CompensationScheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 955-56 (1993).
330. See Rabin, supra note 329, at 956.
331. See, e.g., Jaclyn Shoshana Levine, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program:Can It Still Protect an Essential Technology?, 4 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 283, 288
(1998).
332. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
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Even more important is the need to recognize the public law
benefits of tort law in cases involving preemption. Even if there is
no constitutional prohibition on Congress simply eliminating certain tort actions to promote national interests, as it has done with
the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act and the Graves
Amendment," 5 at least in those cases, Congress was quite explicit
in its intent to preempt all common law suits for relief.336 In many
of the recent preemption cases the Court has considered, however,
the problem is that Congress has not been clear about whether it
intends to preempt state tort law or whether it intends to delegate
to federal agencies the power to preempt state tort law through
regulation.3 37 In these preemption cases, the question often becomes
whether the Court should defer to the federal agencies' position that
their regulations should displace state tort law that allegedly
interferes with federal regulatory goals.3 3
Do the agency regulations address the public law goals of
deterrence and compensation sufficiently to act as a substitute for
the tort law being displaced? The answer likely is no. With regard
to deterrence, the lack of adequate time, money, and staffing in the
agencies regulating drugs, medical devices, and consumer products
means that injured parties cannot always rely on agencies to ensure
that products are safe, even if those products meet agency standards, because the agency cannot always adequately review the
products at issue and set appropriate safety standards.33 9 Moreover,
even in cases in which products violate agency standards, preemption of state tort law forces victims to rely on less-than-perfect
agency enforcement because of the lack of private rights of action in
the federal food and drug law, the Medical Device Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, and many other federal statutes regulating public health and safety.3 4 ° As for compensation, with the
exception of specific federal funding created for vaccine injuries,
335. See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 180, 184 and accompanying text.
337. See Rabin, supra note 41, at 296 ("Congress has been notoriously vague in indicating
its intention to preempt, let alone its intention to delegate this power to an agency pursuant
to the creation of regulatory authority.").
338. See supra Part IV.B; see also Sharkey, supra note 274.
339. See Kass, supra note 4, at 1674-75 (discussing problems with agency funding and
enforcement).
340. See Rabin, supra note 41, at 301.
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nuclear energy accidents, and the like,34 ' there is no general federal
funding to compensate injured parties for harm caused by regulated
products and industries, and no private rights of action available
under the federal enabling statutes that regulate such products and
industries.
Federal court preemption decisions involving state regulatory
compliance defenses highlight this problem. As noted in Part II, in
the 1990s states began experimenting with granting immunity to
drug companies from punitive damages and, in the case of Michigan, from liability entirely, if the FDA has approved the drug in
question.3 42 Each of these statutes contains an exception providing
that the defendant is not entitled to immunity if the plaintiff can
show that the defendant intentionally withheld or misrepresented
to the FDA information concerning the drug and that the drug
would not have been approved if the information had been accurately provided.3 43 Thus, each of these states balanced the extent to
which it wished to limit the liability of drug manufacturers against
some level of deterrence and compensation for fraudulent activity.
After the Court's 2001 decision in Buckman prohibiting state
suits for fraud-on-the-FDA, the question was whether the fraud
exceptions to state regulatory compliance defenses, as well as any
common law fraud claims against drug manufacturers in states
without such defenses, remained valid or whether they were
preempted as interfering with the FDA's exclusive interest in
policing fraud in the drug approval process.34 4 Federal lower courts
have split on this issue. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that the fraud exception to the Michigan regulatory compliance
defense was preempted under Buckman and severed it from the
remainder of the statute, leaving drug manufacturers with virtually
complete immunity from product liability suits.3 45 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and held that Buckman
341. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory compliance
statutes for drug manufacturers in New Jersey, Arizona, and Michigan).
343. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5)(a) (West 2008); supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
344. For a recent discussion of Buckman preemption in the context of state regulatory
compliance defenses, see Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveatto Agency Preemption, 102
Nw. U. L. REv. 841 (2008).
345. See Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966-67 (6th Cir. 2004).
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did not preempt the Michigan fraud exception.34 It reasoned that
the state law was not an attempt to police fraud against the FDA
but instead was an effort to define the duties product manufacturers
owed to Michigan consumers.3 47 As such, the Michigan legislation
involved an area of "traditional state concern" entitled to the
presumption against preemption of state law. 4 ' Moreover, the
Second Circuit found no evidence in Buckman that the Supreme
Court intended to use principles of implied preemption (there is no
express preemption clause in the federal food and drug law) to
eliminate all evidence of fraud involving the FDA in "run of the mill"
tort cases.349 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2007 to
resolve the issue, but split 4-4 (Justice Roberts did not participate),
leaving the issue for another day.SO
These developments show the problems with the Court's broad
preemption decisions, particularly in cases involving implied preemption. The legislative history indicates that Michigan legislators
enacted the statute based on a concern that "unlimited liability for
drug manufacturers would threaten the financial viability of many
enterprises and could add substantially to the cost and unavailability of many drugs." '' In making this policy choice, however,
Michigan lawmakers also intended to preserve some measure of
compensation and deterrence through tort law in cases in which
the drug company acted in a fraudulent manner to obtain its drug
approval." 2 Buckman, and the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of
Buckman, limits the ability of state legislatures to experiment with
the extent to which they wish to utilize state tort law to protect
their citizens and deter misconduct within their jurisdictions. At
least four members of the current Supreme Court were prepared to
eliminate the ability of states to make those choices with regard to
statutory regulatory compliance defenses and perhaps the use of

346. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2007), affd by an equally
divided Court sub nom. Warner-Lambert v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curiam).
347. Id. at 94-95.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 97.
350. Warner-Lambert, 128 S. Ct. 1168.
351. Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing State Fiscal
Agency, Revised Bill Analysis, S.B. 344 & H.B. 4508 (Mich. 1996)).
352. See supra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.
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any evidence involving fraud in the regulatory approval process in
common law fraud claims. 53
By taking this issue from the states and placing it solely in the
hands of federal agencies-not even Congress-state legislative
bodies have a decreased ability to experiment with attempts to
achieve the public law goals of compensation and deterrence while
still limiting tort law burdens on industry. Robert Rabin has argued
that the benefits associated with placing states in charge of products liability law likely outweigh any uniformity benefits served by
creating a national liability standard or national damage cap. 5 4
Rabin focuses in particular on the ability of states to monitor their
tort reform actions-and adjust them if the results are too harsh-in
a way that a "remote" Congress is unlikely to do.355 When it is a
federal agency, rather than Congress, that would be displacing state
law, the federalism concerns are even greater and should lead to
even more caution in preemption cases in the absence of express
congressional intent to displace state tort law fully. The Court's
recent preemption jurisprudence, as highlighted by the Buckman
implied preemption cases, calls into question whether public law
goals of tort law can be met when tort law is displaced without a
substitute.35 6 Closer attention to the limited ability of the federal
agencies to act as a real substitute for the public law goals of torts
should weigh against preemption of state tort law, even in the face
of agency pro-preemption arguments.
What about the private law aspects of tort law? As Goldberg has
argued, the hallmarks of the tort system are its creation of a civil
353. See Warner-Lambert, 128 S. Ct. 1168; see also In re Medtronic, Inc. Implantable
Defibrillators Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 886, 895 (D. Minn. 2006) (rejecting arguments by
defendants that plaintiffs could not use any evidence of the defendant's alleged efforts to
defraud or otherwise manipulate the federal regulatory process to establish claims of
negligence and strict products liability against medical device manufacturer); McDarby v.
Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223, 272-76 (N.J. Ct. App. 2008) (invalidating fraud exception to New
Jersey statutory limitation on punitive damage claims against drug manufacturers under
federal preemption principles).
354. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
1 (1997).
355. Id. at 18-19.
356. See id. at 29 (stating that even if Congress is free to replace state tort law with a
federal regulatory scheme, it is important to keep in mind the "comparative institutional
competence of state common law adjudication and federal regulatory action," and the
"functional reality that federal regulation is devoid of a compensation mechanism').
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system that "empowers the victim to seek redress from a wrongdoer
rather than as the
that has acted wrongfully toward him [or her] ...
vicarious beneficiary of a duty owed to the public at large. 35 7 As
such, tort law "empowers victims in particular ways" by giving to
them the right to complain and the right to choose whether or
not to pursue "redress" rather than leaving that choice to the state
(as is done with criminal prosecutions).35 8 "Redress" is not simply
monetary compensation to make the victim "whole," but the right
to have the "wrong" acknowledged and, if the victim chooses, to seek
an appropriate amount of damages to act as "satisfaction. 35 9
Likewise, Thomas Colby articulates a private law vision of punitive
damages, arguing that "punitive damages are a form of legalized
private revenge-both theoretically and constitutionally distinct
from the public retribution and deterrence achieved through
criminal law., 360 He states that allowing "controlled revenge" is in
private
the interest of justice because it helps prevent "extra legal"
361
revenge and also "vindicates the dignity of the victim.
To the extent these private law aspects of tort law are seen as
valuable in our society, a federal scheme of regulation and compensation cannot replace tort law in meeting these goals, although it
may meet other important goals such as providing compensation to
victims without the cost and difficulty of litigation. Simply eliminating tort law or punitive damages through preemption doctrine or
due process limits on punitive damages eliminates the private law
benefits of torts without even attempting to replace it with anything
that would at least achieve some compensation goals in return.
In sum, there is something lost with regard to both the public
benefits and private benefits of tort law if Congress and the courts
displace such law. Congress can certainly make that choice, at least
in most circumstances, under its Commerce Clause authority. But
the problem addressed here, however, is ensuring the courts
explicitly acknowledge the full extent of what is to be lost through
their decisions before acting.

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See Goldberg, supra note 8,at 599.
Id. at 601.
See id. at 602-05.
See Colby, supra note 311 (manuscript at 3).
Id. (manuscript at 44).
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If courts do so, they may weigh agency statements in favor of
preemption of state law with more skepticism, particularly in cases
in which Congress has not been clear that it intends broadly to
preempt state tort law through its legislation and has not provided
any substitute mechanism for private parties to seek relief for
harm.36 2 Likewise, the current view on punitive damages may
expand to include not only their public law goals, but their important private law goals as well. Once the private and public law
benefits of tort law are expressly acknowledged and valued, courts
can recognize that eliminating key aspects of state tort law eliminates not just another form of public regulation covered in other
areas of federal and state law, but instead leaves an irreplaceable
gap where important rights to private redress used to be.
Creating new language around state tort law and rights to
redress may not have any immediate impact. But language matters,
at least in the long run. If the judicial language of tort law becomes
richer and more multi-faceted, it may create a fuller picture of what
states are attempting to do with their tort experiments and the
weight those experiments should be given under principles of
federalism.
CONCLUSION

This Article explores "tort experiments" in the states for the
purpose of making three main points. First, state tort experiments
today include not only common law and legislative efforts to cut
back on earlier expansions of tort rights and remedies in product
liability and personal injury cases but also include common law and
legislative efforts to expand and create new tort rights and remedies
in the areas of consumer protection, privacy, publicity, and environmental protection. Second, state tort experiments contain aspects of
362. Notably, no private right of action exists under many of the federal laws at issue in
the preempetion cases discussed in Part IV.B, including the federal laws governing medical
devices, pesticides, and prescription drugs. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431,
448 (2005) (noting that the federal pesticide law does not provide a federal remedy to farmers
or others injured by the violation of the law's labeling requirements); Medtronic v. Lohr, 418
U.S. 470, 478 (1996) (noting the absence of an explicit or implicit private right of action under
the MDA); Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (noting that all
parties to the case agreed with the lower court's conclusion that there is no federal right of
action under the federal food and drug law).
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both private law and public law. Third, the Supreme Court in recent
years appears to have embraced a public law view of tort that fails
to recognize the important private law aspects of tort, particularly
the existence of a state structure that grants citizens the right to
obtain redress for private wrongs. The failure to recognize these
private law aspects of state tort law is perhaps one of the reasons
why the Court so easily excluded state tort law from its "federalist
revolution," as shown by its recent decisions involving preemption
and punitive damages. Ultimately, by placing a spotlight on these
issues, this Article hopes to assist in creating a richer judicial and
scholarly language surrounding the federal review of state tort law
that will better allow states to serve their role as "laboratories of
democracy."

